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CORPORATE LAW-A SNAPSHOT OF THE TAKEOVER DECADE:

Polaroid Corp. v. Disney-WHETHER

A TARGET CORPORATION HAS

THIRD PARTY STANDING TO AssERT A VIOLATION OF THE ALL
HOLDERS RULE

Give me where to stand, and I will move the earth. l
Archimedes

INTRODUCTION

From an economic standpoint, the 1980s may well be
remembered as the decade of the corporate acquisition. 2 An
onslaught of takeover3 activity, financed in large part by junk
1. PAPPUS OF ALEXANDRIA, Col/ectio, bk. VIII, prop. 10, sec. 11 (c. 220 B.C.) (re
ferring to the lever).
2. "Last year [1982], this Nation experienced a recordbreaking wave of corporate
mergers and acquisitions." Corporate Takeovers: Oversight Hearing Be/ore the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law o/the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep. Peter W. Rodino, Ir., Chairman).
"The frequency of [corporate takeovers] of late is virtually without precedent." Id. at 148
n.2 (statement of Dennis 1. Block and Yvette Miller).
The total value of mergers and acquisitions increased from $12 billion in 1975 to $122
billion in 1984 to $180 billion in 1985. Buffett, Dingman, Gray & Lowenstein, Hostile
Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND
TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 10, 10 (1. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S.
Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988); see also DeMott, Comporative Dimensions 0/ Takeover Regula
tion, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER,
supra, at 398, 402-04.
Total dollar value paid for corporate acquisitions in 1988 was a record $247 billion.
Hyatt, Firms' Acquisitions Rose 22% From '88 in the First Half, Wall St. 1., Aug. 30, 1989,
at B5, col. 1. Acquisitions in which prices were disclosed totaled $188.1 billion for the first
nine months of 1989, up 15% from the same period in 1988. Mergers and Acquisitions Rose
13% in Third Period, Wall St. 1., Oct. 30, 1989, at A2, col. 4. Commentators have spoken
of a "deluge of proposed takeovers and leveraged bUy-outs." See Dorfman, When a Stock
Is Put in Play, Patience and a Little Study Can Pay, Wall St. 1., Oct. 21, 1988, at Cl, col. 3;
see also Smith, In Takeover-Ridden Times, Mighty Fortresses Are Some Firms, Wall St. 1.,
Oct. 28, 1988, at Cl, col. 3 ("Takeover-Ridden Times"). "A decade ago, LBOs [leveraged
buy-outs] might have merited just a footnote in finance texts, but now they seem to be
sweeping through corporate America." Anders, With Leveraged Buy-Outs in Spotlight,
Here Are Answers to Common Questions, Wall St. 1., Oct. 28, 1988, at Bl, col. 3.
3. "A corporate 'take-over' actually is an acquisition of assets and liabilities or a
merger of the ownership of net assets." Hearing, supra note 2, at 26 (statement of George
1. Benston). Martin Lipton and Erica H. Steinberger define "takeover" in a contemporary
context, employing the colorful lexica popularized during the acquisitions of the 1980s:
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bonds, 4 resulted in a decrease of a significant percentage of the out~
standing shares of stock on the New York Stock Exchange. s Exotic
A takeover is an attempt by a bidder ("raider") to acquire control of a sub
ject company ("target") through acquisition of some or all of its outstanding
shares. More commonly, takeover bids are made directly to shareholders of the
target as a cash tender offer or as an exchange offer of raider securities for target
stock.
The principal takeover approaches include a "friendly" transaction negoti
ated with management; a "bear hug," in which the raider notifies the target of a
proposed acquisition transaction; a "hostile" offer made directly to target share
holders, without management approval; and, as a supplement or alternative to
these approaches, large open market and/or privately negotiated purchases of tar
get stock.
I M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 1.01[2] (1989); see also
3C H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURmES AND FEDERAL CoRPORATE LAW § 13.19[1] (1990)
(briefly discussing takeovers and ways to effectuate them).
For a definition of corporate "raiders," see infra note 15.
4. A '~unk bond" is a high-yielding debt security rated below investment grade by
the bond-rating agencies. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra
note 2, at 314, 337. Typically, junk bonds are used to finance a leveraged buy-out (a take
over by a third party) or a management buy-out of a company. See L. SOLOMON, D.
SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CoRPORATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 1062 (2d ed. 1988); Man
agement Buy-Outs: No Staying Power, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 18, 1989, at 79; see also
Anders & Schwadel, Costly Advice: Wall Streeters Helped Interco Defeat Raiders But at a
Heavy Price, Wall St. J., July 11, 1990, at AI, col. 6 (corporation used junk bonds to
recapitalize itself to avoid a takeover). Ultimately, this high-yielding debt is paid off via
cash flow generated from the target company's business operations or from the full or par
tial liquidation of the target company's assets. 3C H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3,
§ 13.36. See generally The Financing ofMergers and Acquisitions: Hearing Before the Sub
comm. on Domestic Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 246-97 (1985) (report by the Congressional Research Service
of the Library of Congress: "The Role of High Yield Bonds (Junk Bonds) in Capital Mar
kets and Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications"); Lipton & Brownstein, Take
over Responses and Directors' Responsibilities-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1411-12
(1985); Comment, Junk Bonds: Do They Have a Value?, 35 EMORY L.J. 921, 922-32
(1986).
5. See Winans, Stock Market Loses Vital Corporate Crutch, Wall St. J., July 23, 1990,
at Cl, col. 3 (Takeovers and corporate stock buy-backs "reduced the market value of all
New York Stock Exchange-listed issues by an average 6.5% a year."). In 1988, "5 percent
of the value of publicly held shares, or $130 billion, disappeared" as a result of "corporate
buybacks, leveraged buyouts and mergers and acquisitions." Elias, Takeover Debt Turns
Up Heat on Loid-back Managements, INSIGHT, Apr. 2, 1990, at 40 (quoting Harvard Busi
ness School professor Jay O. Light). "About $500 billion of stock has been removed from
the market [from 1984 to mid-1989] ... because of mergers, leveraged buy-outs, and com
panies' buying their own shares." Torres, Rapid Stock-Supply Shrinkage Continues, Wall
St. J., July 14, 1989, at Cl, col. 3. "Buyouts and buybacks ... [resulted in a] lower stock
supply." Crossen, Merger Activity Expected to Ease, Not Halt, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1987, at
8B, col. 3 (citing Federal Reserve System data). "Takeovers and stock buy-backs have far
outweighed new stock issues." Metz, Bull's Run: Stocks' Five-Year Rise Has Showered
Benefits Unevenly in Economy, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1987, at I, col. 6, 7, col. 5 (citing
Goldman, Sachs & Co. data); see also Slater, Stock Market Faced Massive Exodus in '88,
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takeover plays such as street sweeps6 and front-end loaded, two-tiered
tender offers7 reshaped the landscape of corporate America. Mergers
and acquisitions rose to the level of corporate warfare. s Irwin Jacobs,9
Ronald Perelman,10 Harold Simmons,11 Carl lcahn,12 and Sir James
Goldsmith,13 among others, built fortunes and developed reputations
as consummate takeover artists. 14
In response to the efforts of corporate raiders, IS a great many
Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1988, at Cl, col. 3 (Net outflow was a result of corporate takeovers and
restructurings.); Ladennan, Farrell & Frank, The Bulls Breathe Fire: A Scorching Rally
Looks Like It Has a Lot ofFuel to Bum, Bus. WK., Nov. 25, 1985, at 34, 35 ("An unprece
dented wave of corporate ... takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and company stock repurchases
... has shrunk the supply of stocks ...."); Perham, The Case of the Vanishing Equities,
DUN'S Bus. MONTH, Nov. 1985, at 55 (Leveraged buyouts, in part, account for the
shrinkage in the stock supply.).
6. "Street sweeps," also referred to as "market sweeps," are "blitzkrieg, large-scale
acquisition programs in the stock markets." Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep
Takeovers, 1989 DUKE L.J. 202, 202 & n.1. "Bidders and target[] [companies] alike found
that, by combining aggressive open-market purchases with privately negotiated transac
tions from institutional investors and arbitrageurs, they could gain control of enough stock
to end contested takeover contests." Id. at 202. This change of control often occurred
within a matter of minutes or hours. Id. at 202 & nn.2-3. Such acquisitions are also known
as "Saturday Night Specials." See 3C H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3, § 13.35(11).
7.
In a front-end loaded, two-tiered tender offer, the [potential acquiror or of
feror] ... offers to buy, at a premium price, only enough shares to establish a
controlling position in the target company. Typically, the offeror accumulates up
to five percent of the target's stock through open market purchases, and then
makes a tender offer for enough of the outstanding shares to give it voting control.
Once it gains control of the target, the offeror merges the target into itself or a
subsidiary and freezes out the target's remaining shareholders by forcing them to
accept cash or securities valued at a lower price per share than the original tender
offer price.
Comment, The Front-End Loaded. Two-Tiered Tender Offer, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 811, 812
(1983) (footnote omitted); see also Prentice, Front-End Loaded. Two-Tiered Tender Offers:
An Examination of the Counterproductive Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE
W. REs. 389 (1988-89).
8. See Comment, Corporate Takeover Battles--Shark Repellent Charter and Bylaw
Provisions that Deter Hostile Tender Offers or Other Acquisitio~A Comprehensive Exami
nation, 27 How. L.J. 1683, 1684 n.l (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Shark Repellent].
9. See King, Three Raging Bulls and Two Restrained Ones, FORBES, Oct. 23, 1989, at
362; Magnet, Is ITT Fighting Shadows-<Jr Raiders?, FORTUNE, Nov. 11, 1985, at 25.
10. See The Forbes Four Hundred, FORBES, Oct. 23, 1989, at 154.
11. Id. at 162.
12. Id. at 186; see Penn, Raiding Parties: Friends and Relatives Hitch Their Wagon
to Carllcahn's Star, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
13. See Smith, Legendary Raider Sir James Goldsmith Adds to Lore With His Bidfor
B.A. T, Wall St. J., July 12, 1989, at A4, col. 1; see also Lublin, With U.S. Takeovers Grown
Expensive. Sir James Goldsmith Looks to Britain, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1989, at A21, col. 1.
14. See Worthy, What's Next for the Raiders, FORTUNE, Nov. 11, 1985, at 21.
15. Senator Williams, sponsor of the Williams Act Amendments to the Securities

66

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:63

companies developed antitakeover strategies. 16 Shark repellents and
porcupine provisions,17 poison pills,1s asset sales,19 golden para
chutes,20 white knights21 and whitemailing,22 greenmailing,23 PacExchange Act of 1934, termed "raiders" to be tender offerors who threaten companies with
their takeover maneuvers. III CONGo REC. 28,257 (1965) (statement of Sen. Williams).
"The individual or group who makes the tender offer is referred to as the 'shark',
'raider', 'bidder', 'offeror' or 'acquiring company' and is obligated to purchase the tendered
shares if the specifications of the offer are met." Comment, Shark Repellent, supra note 8,
at 1686.
For a synopsis of well-known corporate raiders, see Crudele, Corporate Raiders
Looking Less Dangerous These Days, Hartford Courant, Dec. 10, 1989, at Bl, col. 5.
16. For a brief discussion of the typical takeover candidate in both an historical and
a contemporary context, see 1 A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES,
AND PLANNING 3-6 (Supp. 1987).
17. "Shark repellents," also known as "porcupine provisions," are corporate charter
amendments "designed to make takeovers more difficult." Prentice, supra note 7, at 410
11. These amendments may include provisions implementing a staggered board of
directors; limitations on the removal of directors; constraints on increasing the size of or
filling vacancies on the board; or restrictions on the appointment or removal of officers and
board committees. 1 SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK
FOR THE PRACTITIONER § 4, at 115-28 (R. Winter, M. Stumpf & G. Hawkins eds. Supp.
1989) [hereinafter SHARK REPELLENTS]. The amendment may consist of a directive that
the board consider factors other than money to be paid in a takeover. Id. § 6. For an
overview of other "shark repellents," see 1-2 SHARK REPELLENTS, supra.
18. "Poison pills" are shareholder rights plans. A potential target company issues
shareholders rights or preferred shares which become active only upon the occurrence of a
particular event, such as the acquisition of a certain percentage of the target company's
stock by an outside party. Prentice, supra note 7, at 412; Comment, Corporate Takeovers:
Defensive Techniques Utilized Agains.t Raiders, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 695, 707-08 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Defensive Techniques]; see also 3C H. BLooMENTHAL, supra note 3,
§ 13.35(1).
For a summary of the first use of a "poison pill," see Centennial Journal: 1()() Years in
Business: Just What the Target's Doctor Ordered, 1983, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1989, at Bl,
col. 5.
19. Asset sales by the target company can make it less attractive to the acquiror.
These sales can include full or partial liquidation of the company ("scorched-earth
defense") if liquidation value is greater than the potential acquiror's tender price, or can
involve the sale of "crown jewels" (highly valuable corporate assets or subsidiaries which
attract the potential acquiror to the target company). Comment, Defensive Techniques,
supra note 18, at 710.
20. A "golden parachute" grants a manager of a target company generous severance
benefits should a hostile takeover occur, thus making a takeover of the target company
more expensive for the potential acquiror. Prentice, supra note 7, at 420. See generally 2
SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 17, § 1-6.
A variant of a golden parachute, the "tin parachute" (sometimes known as a "silver
parachute"), grants all employees of a target company severance and other benefits if they
lose their jobs following a takeover. 2 SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 17, § 1, at 431-32;
Cowan, New Ploy: 'Tin Parachutes', N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1987, at Dl, col. 3; e.g.,
Hymowitz, Kodak Gives 'Parachutes'to Workers, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1990, at Bl, col. 6.
See generally Ryan, Corporate Directors and the "Social Costs" of Takeovers--Reflections
on the Tin Parachute, 64 TuL. L. REv. 3 (1989).
21. A "white knight" is a friendly third party who buys securities of or merges with a

1991]

THIRD PARTY STANDING & THE ALL-HOLDERS RULE

67

Man defenses,24 lock-ups,2s recapitalizations,26 and share repurchases
and self-tender offers,27 among other tactics,28 became key weapons in
the battles for corporate control.
target corporation to prevent a takeover by a potential acquiror. Comment, Defensive
Techniques, supra note 18, at 710-11. A "white knight" may also be called a "white
squire." See Bulkeley & Rose, Polaroid Gains Peace Accord; Stock Falls $4.50, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 28, 1989, at A4, col. 1; see also Wander & LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: Corporate
Control Transactions and Today's Business Judgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAW. 29, 51 (1986).
22. "Whitemailing" occurs when a friendly third party buys a large amount of a
target company's stock in advance of any takeover activity. The friendly party promises
not to sell the stock for a certain period of time or not to join forces with a hostile acquiror.
In return, the friendly party has a voice in running the company. This preemptive activity
may frustrate potential acquirors from making any bids for the target company. See White,
'White Squires' Step Into Breach As Debt-Driven Investing Falters, Wall St. J., Feb. 21,
1990, at Cl, col. 4; Sandler, Knightly Warren Buffett Trips Up 'Rescued' Champion
Shareholders, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1989, at Cl, col. 4; see also White, Ted Forstmann
Struggles for Cash for Squire Fund, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1990, at C 1, col. 3. The friendly
party may also purchase convertible preferred stock, paying favorable above-market rates.
If a tender offer is made, the friendly party's stock may convert to a significant percentage
of the target company's common voting shares, also frustrating potential takeover
attempts. See Sandler, supra.
23. "The term 'greenniail' refers to the [target corporation's] practice of buying out a
takeover bidder's stock at a premium that is not available to other shareholders in order to
prevent the takeover." Unoca1 Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.13
(1985).
24. In a "Pac-Man defense," the target company makes a bid for the securities of the
company that is attempting to acquire it. Sappideen, Takeover Bids and Target Share
holder Protection: The Regulatory Framework in the United Kingdom, United States and
Australia, 8 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 281, 300 (1986); see also Block & Miller,
The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEC.
REG. L.J. 44, 64-66 (1983).
25. In a "lock-up," the target company grants options to friendly third parties.
Comment, Defensive Techniques, supra note 18, at 712. The options, which allow the third
party to purchase stock or assets of the target company, may be exercised if another party,
such as a potential acquiror, accumulates a certain percentage of the target company's
outstanding shares. Id.
26. A "recapitalization" is a financial restructuring of a target company which in
creases its debt/equity ratio, making the company less desirable to a potential acquiror.
See I REsOURCE MATERIALS: TAKEOVER DEFENSES AND DIRECTORS' LIABILmES 64
(M. Lipton ed. 1986) [hereinafter REsOURCE MATERIALS]. Typically, the target com
pany's public shareholders exchange their stock for cash and/or debt and occasionally, for
new shares in the company (the "stub"). 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 16, at 388.172. The
newly-issued debt securities may contain covenants which restrict the sale of corporate
assets, further lessening the attractiveness of the target company. Id. at 388.173.
27. A "share repurchase" occurs when a target company buys its own shares in the
marketplace in order to keep the shares away from a potential acquiror or to strengthen the
control position of management. 3C H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3, § 13.30(3).
In a "self-tender offer," a target company offers to purchase its shares from its share
holders at a price above that of the potential acquiror, thus making a takeover more diffi
cult. See I REsOURCE MATERIALS, supra note 26, at 46. For the Securities and Exchange
Commission's definition of "issuer tender offer," see infra note 138.
28. A great variety of colorful terms describing antitakeover strategies and players
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A new defensive tool, the Employee Stock Ownership Plan
("ESOP"),29 first arrived when Polaroid Corporation ("Polaroid")
successfully thwarted corporate raider Roy Disney's hostile efforts to
acquire the company.30 On September 9, 1988, Disney, through a
have developed. See. e.g., Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Struc
tural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 775-76 (1982).
29. An "employee stock ownership plan" is "a fonn of statutory pension program[ ]
designed to invest employee retirement assets in the stock of the employer." First Nat'l
Bank of Blue Island Employee Stock Ownership Plan v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 802 F.2d 291, 293 (7th Cir. 1986) (construing Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461)). See generally 129 CONGo REC. SI6,629-44 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1983) (state
ment of Sen. Long) (discussing ESOPs generally and the Employee Stock Ownership Act of
1983 specifically); Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination. and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749 (1990) (discussing ESOPs
and other fonns of employee ownership). Specifically, an ESOP is a stock bonus or stock
purchase plan in which employers give or sell stock to employees via a trust. Comment, A
Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1451, 1484
(1990). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Internal Revenue
Code and Regulations are the primary federal controls governing the scope of ESOPs. See
generally I.R.C. §§ 401-409 (1988) (general rule governing pension, profit-sharing, and
stock bonus plans) (I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) defines an ESOP.); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988)) (defining an ESOP at 29 U.S.C. § 11D7(d)(6)). ESOPs may be either
leveraged or nonleveraged. Comment, The Satumization ofAmerican Plants: Infringement
or Expansion of Workers' Rights?, 72 MINN. L. REv. 173, 191 n.65 (1987). See generally
Note, The False Promise of Worker Capitalism: Congress and the Leveraged Employee
Stock Ownership Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 148 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The False Promise].
While the ESOP program's goal is to broaden ownership of capital, "Congress ...
transfonned the ESOP from a simple retirement account into a corporate financing tool"
by allowing it to be leveraged. First Nat'l Bank, 802 F.2d at 293 (construing Note, The
False Promise, supra, at 154). Th.e legislative history of the ESOP program evidences that
Congress intended "to promote ESOPs as a suitable device for a broad range of corporate
activity." Id. (construing Note, The False Promise, supra, at 154 & n.24). In this regard,
the use of an ESOP as an antitakeover device may increase the obstacles and costs a poten
tial acquiror faces:
Prior to or during the offer, stock is issued to the plan which has the effect of
diluting the voting strength of any stoCk the offeror may have already acquired
and increasing the amount which it must acquire to gain voting control. It also
puts the newly issued shares into possession of target company employees, who
likely will be loyal and not tender to the offeror.
Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Other Defenses to Hostile Tender Offers, 21
WASHBURN L.J. 580, 601 (1982) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Note, Employee Stock
Ownership Plans]. Employees may also.be unwilling to tender their stock to an offeror due
to fears over job security and unfamiliar employment policies. Id. at 601 n.207 (quoting E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CoR
PORATE CONTROL 198 (1977)). See generally D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE
BUSINESS JUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 184-200
(3d ed. 1989) (discussing ESOPs as antitakeover devices). For infonnation on Polaroid's
use of its ESOP, see infra note 46.
30. Polaroid Corp. V. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988). Prior to the Polaroid
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number of wholly-owned subsidiaries of Shamrock Holdings, Inc.
("Shamrock"), 31 made a $2.6 billion cash tender offer for the out
standing common stock of Polaroid at $42 per share. 32 However,
Shamrock excluded the shares held by Polaroid's ESOP,33 claiming
they were invalidly issued because the ESOP was formed to entrench
incumbent management34 and impede a potential takeover.3S Sham
rock's offer was contingent on the satisfaction of several express condi
tions,36 including that the issuance of Polaroid stock to the ESOP had
to be invalidated or rescinded judicially, or Shamrock had to be satis
fied that the ESOP stock was not outstanding. 37
On September 20, Polaroid brought an action to enjoin the tender
offer,38 alleging that Shamrock's exclusion of the ESOP shares from
the offer violated the Securities and Exchange Commission's All-Hold
ers Rule 39 • Shamrock questioned whether Polaroid had standing to
Disney hostilities, stock issuance to an ESOP had been infrequently used as a tender offer
defense. See Comment, Shark Repellent, supra note 8, at 1688 n.17. However, Polaroid's
successful use of its ESOP in such a manner led mergers and acquisitions specialists to state
that "sales to ESOPs ... are likely to become a key anti-takeover weapon." Bulkeley &
Rose, supra note 21. The mergers and acquisitions chief at one Wall Street finn stated, "I
don't know of a Fortune 500 company that hasn't been pitched half a dozen ESOP propos
als in the last three months." Id.; see also Altmann, Another Battle in the Takeover Wars,
or Just an ESOP Fable, Wall St. J., June 12, 1989, at A14, col. 3; Hilder & Smith, ESOP
Defenses Are Likely to Increase, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1989, at A2, col. 2.
31. Shamrock Acquisition III, Inc., which made the tender offer to purchase Polar
oid, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Emerald Isle Associates, L.P., of which Shamrock
Capital Investors III, Inc. was the general partner. Shamrock Capital Investors III, Inc.
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shamrock Holdings of Califomia, Inc., which itself was a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Shamrock Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation owned by
Roy and Patricia Disney and their children. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5 n.2, Polaroid
Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-3676).
32. Polaraid, 862 F.2d at 990.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting Appellee's Answering Brief at 8).
35. Appellee's Answering Brief at 1, Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir.
1988) (No. 88-3676).
The Delaware Chancery Court subsequently upheld the validity of the Polaroid
ESOP. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
36. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990.
37. Id. Shamrock eventually sued Polaroid to invalidate the ESOP. See infra note
46.
A related condition required that a minimum of 90% of the outstanding shares, ex
cluding the ESOP shares, had to be tendered. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990.
38. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 698 F. Supp. 1169, 1170-71 (D. Del.), aff'd in pan and
vacated in part, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(l) (1990). The All-Holders Rule, which focuses on
the equal treatment of security holders, states that "[n]o bidder shall make a tender offer
unless ... [t]he tender offer is open to all security holders ofthe class of securities subject to
the tender offer." Id.
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raise such a claim. 4O
The United States District Court denied Polaroid's motion for a
preliminary injunction against Shamrock's offer,41 despite finding that
Polaroid did have standing under the All-Holders Rule. 42 Polaroid
immediatelyappealed. 43 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision denying Polaroid
injunctive relief based on its All-Holders Rule claim, but stated that it
was because Polaroid lacked standing to sue. 44 For other reasons,
however, the court granted Polaroid's motion for a preliminary injunc
tion,4S and remanded the case for further proceedings.46
Polaroid, 698 F. Supp. at 1174.
Id. at 1181.
42. Id. at 1174. The court assumed, in the absence of controlling case law, that
Polaroid had standing, but found no violation of the All-Holders Rule. Id.
43. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
44. Id. at 990. The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's holding that
Shamrock's financial advisors, Wertheim Schroder & Co. Inc. and Drexel Burnham Lam
bert Inc., were not bidders and thus did not have to disclose financial information about
themselves as required by 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14d-100, Schedule 14D-1, Item 9. Id. at 991
n.2. In the lower court, Polaroid had argued that the financial advisors were "doing more
than just financing the tender offer" because, inter alia, they had the option to purchase
equity in the takeover. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 698 F. Supp. 1169, 1177-78 (D. Del.),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988). However, the court of
appeals confined its plenary discussion to misrepresentation and All-Holders Rule issues,
stating that the facts concerning the bidder issue were similar enough to City Capital Asso
ciates Limited Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988), to render that case
controlling. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 991 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1988). For a
discussion of the misrepresentation issue, see infra note 45.
45. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990. Polaroid had also alleged that Shamrock's disclosure
misrepresented its compliance with Federal Reserve Board margin requirements, violating
section 14(e), the anti-fraud provision of the Williams Act. Id. at 990-91. See generally 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988) (section 14(e) of the Williams Act). The requirements limit a shell
corporation's use of debt as a financing vehicle for corporate acquisitions. Polaroid, 862
F.2d at 1004-05 & n.16; see 12 C.F.R. § 207.112 (1990). See generally 12 C.F.R. §§ 207,
220, 221, 224 (1990). The court of appeals reversed the district court decision denying
Polaroid preliminary injunctive relief on this ground. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1005-06.
46. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1005-06. A "maelstrom of litigation" surrounded Sham
rock's unwelcome effort to acquire Polaroid. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,
709 F. Supp. 1311, 1313 (D. Del. 1989). In one suit, Shamrock and Polaroid's stockholders
sued Polaroid and its directors to invalidate the ESOP, on the allegation that the purpose of
Polaroid's decision to give control of about 14% of its common shares to its ESOP was to
impede any takeover of the corporation by a potential acquiror. Shamrock Holdings, Inc.
v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989) (ESOP was fair despite its antitakeover
aspects).
In another instance, Shamrock sought to restrain Polaroid's defensive tactics. Sham
rock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., No. 10,582 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (WESTLAW,
DE-CS directory). Those tactics included issuing to Corporate Partners, L.P., an investor
friendly to Polaroid management, $300 million in preferred stock convertible into
6,000,000 common shares, seven year warrants for 635,000 common shares, and the right
to name two directors to Polaroid's board. Id. at 2. Polaroid also intended a $1.1 billion
40.

41.
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In deciding whether Polaroid had standing as a target corpora
tion to assert a violation of the All-Holders Rule, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed two strains of jurisprudence. 47 The court
first examined whether Polaroid had standing under a "private right of
action" theory.48 Next, the court considered whether Polaroid had
stock repurchase recapitalization plan, and announced that, with its investment advisor
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., it was exploring ways of using the proceeds of a patent
infringement suit against Eastman Kodak Co. to enhance short-term shareholder value.
Id. See generally Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.) (on the
issue of liability), cm. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
No. 76-1634-MA (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (on the issue.
of damages), modified, No. 76-1634-MA (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (reducing damage award by $36 million). The Delaware Chancery Court ulti
mately denied all of Shamrock's motions for permanent injunctions. See Shamrock Hold
ings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
On January 19, 1989, Shamrock increased its tender offer price to $45 per share, in
cluding the ESOP shares, or $47 per share if the ESOP shares were invalidated and ex
cluded. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D. Del.
1989). However, Polaroid's stock sale to its ESOP was the crucial component in its suc
cessful bid to stay independent. Bulkeley & Rose, supra note 21. After considerable jock
eying between the parties and several courtrooIJllosses by Shamrock, on March 27, 1989,
Polaroid and Shamrock reached a settlement. Id.; see also Polaroid Details Buy-Back;
Shamrock Tenders Stake, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1989, at C4, col. 4. Their arrangement
included, inter alia, a standstill agreement under which Shamrock would not attempt to
acquire Polaroid for ten years; an end to all litigation between the two parties; a $20 million
reimbursement by Polaroid to Shamrock for offer-related expenses; a $5 million prepay
ment by Polaroid for advertising on radio and television stations owned by Shamrock; and
an agreement by Polaroid to distribute to shareholders a portion of the after-tax proceeds
recovered from Eastman Kodak Co. in the patent infringement lawsuit. Bulkeley & Rose,
supra note 21. See generally Ingrassia & Hirsch, Polaroid's Patent-Case Award, Smaller
Than Anticipated, Is a Relieffor Kodak, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1990, at A3, col. 2 ("Polaroid
promised to distribute ... part of any damage award exceeding $750 million aner taxes;
based on its normal tax rate of about 35%, Polaroid's after-tax proceeds from the $909.5
million award would be about $591 million.... [I]t's unlikely that shareholders will receive
much, if any, of the award."); Letter from I. MacAl1ister Booth, President and Chief Exec
utive Officer of the Polaroid Corporation, to Polaroid shareholders (Oct. 1990) ("We have
said consistently that we will use this award to enhance value for our shareholders. . . .
[B]ut we will not announce how we plan to apply the proceeds until there is a final resolu
tion of this litigation."); POLAROID CoRP., 1990 THIRD QUARTER REPORT 5 (Nov. 1990)
(restating the comment made in the letter from I. MacAllister Booth to Polaroid
shareholders).
47. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 993.
48. Id. at 993-97. A "private right of action" is a judicially-created cause of action
implied to enforce federal laws that do not expressly provide a litigant with a remedy. See
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 74-78 (1975). "If a private right of action exists in favor of a
party, standing follows as a matter of course." Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 993. The Third Cir
cuit Court of Appeals held that the All-Holders Rule creates a private right of action for
shareholders, but not for a target corporation. Id. at 997. Thus, Polaroid had no standing
under the private right of action theory. See id.
The issue of whether private rights of action exist under the Williams· Act has been
surveyed extensively. See, e.g., Pitt, Standing To Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris
Craft: A Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978); Schneider, Implying
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standing as a third party on behalf of its shareholders.49 This Note
focuses on the latter issue - whether a target corporation has stand
ing on behalfofits shareholders to assert a violation of the All-Holders
Rule.
Section I traces the origin of the All-Holders Rule 50 and the stat
utory framework under which it was promulgated. 51 This includes a
discussion of the history and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act
of 193452 (the "Exchange Act") and the Williams Act Amendments53
to the Exchange Act. 54 Section II reviews standing to sue doctrine,
including the requirements of standing, and third party standing and
its exceptions. 55 Section II also presents the advantages and disadvan
tages of associational standing, which weighed in the court of appeals'
conclusion. 56 Section III examines the court's decision in depth. 57 Fi
nally, Section IV provides an analysis of the court's holding that Po
laroid did not have third party standing to assert a violation of the All
Holders Rule by Shamrock. 58 In particular, Section IV addresses why
the court could have ruled that Polaroid satisfied the second associa
tional standing factor required by Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad
vertising Commission. 59 Section IV considers why conflicts of interest
inherent in takeover battles weigh against granting a target corpora
tion third party standing on behalf of its shareholders. 60 Section IV
concludes that during a takeover battle, a target corporation's share
holders are the proper litigants under the All-Holders Rule, and there
fore, Polaroid's ESOP, which was able to bring its own lawsuit, was a
better representative of its members' interests than was the Polaroid
Corporation. 61
Private Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L. REV. 853 (1984);
Comment, An Implied Private Right of Action Under the Williams Act: Tradition vs. Eco
nomic Reality, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 316 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, An Implied Private
Right).
49. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 997-1002.
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14d-lO(a)(I) (1990).
51. See infra notes 62-153 and accompanying text.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-1I (1988).
53. Id. §§ 78/(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f).
54. See infra notes 69-132 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 154-211 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 212-39 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 240-86 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 287-378 and accompanying text.
59. 432 U.S. 333 (1977); see infra notes 295-324 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 325-68 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 369-78 and accompanying text.
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THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK BEHIND THE
ALL-HoLDERS RULE

The Exchange Act62 and the Williams Act63 provided the lega1
foundation for the All-Holders Rule64• Prior to its promulgation by
the Securities and Exchange Commission,6s a corporate raider such as
Shamrock could legally exclude a block of stock from its tender of
fer.66 The All-Holders Rule, which requires that all shareholders of a
class of stock be a1lowed to participate in an offer made to that class, 67
changed that aspect of corporate takeover battles. 68
A.

The History and Purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Williams Act

Congress first passed federal securities laws in response to exces
sive speculation in the stock market during the late 1920s and the re
sultant crash of 1929. 69 Prior to that time, several bills had been
introduced in Congress to regulate securities issuance and trading, 70
and most states had enacted blue sky laws. 71 However, only after the
economic impact of the market collapse registered did the need for a
federa1 scheme to regulate securities become apparent. 72 The ensuing
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-1I (1988).
63. Id §§ 78/(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f). The Securities and Exchange Commission
ignored section 78/(i) when it promUlgated the All-Holders Rule. See infra note 134.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 24O.14d-lO(a)(I) (1990).
65. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules-All-Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act
Release No. 23,421, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 84,016 (July
11, 1986) [hereinafter Amendments to Rules].
66. Despite the technical legality of excluding some stock of a class from a tender
offer, the Securities and Exchange Commission frowned upon the practice. See infra note
145 and accompanying text.
67. See Amendments to Rules, supra note 65, at 88,191.
68. To date, Shamrock is the only corporate raider that has been accused of violating
the All-Holders Rule.
69. W. ATKINS, G. EDWARDS & H. MOULTON, THE REGULATION OF THE SECUR
ITY MARKETS 45-48 (1946); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L.
REv. 607, 613 (1964); see also Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of
Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 119, 125 (1959).
For a brief history of pre-1900 securities regulation, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 1-3 (1988).
70. Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 6, 7 (1959).
71. L. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 16 (1987). "Blue sky
laws" are state statutes which regulate securities. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 173 (6th ed.
1990). Blue sky laws are said to pertain to "speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of 'blue sky.''' HaIl v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539,550 (1917). "By
1933, every state except Nevada had [some form of blue sky law)." Gadsby, supra note 70,
at 8.
72. Blue sky laws were ineffective as a mechanism to prevent the collapse of the
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legislation, the Securities Act of 1933 73 and the Exchange Act,'4 em
phasized two themes: protection of investors and disclosure of
information.75
In 1934, Congress enacted the Exchange Act'6 to regulate trading
and to prevent unfair practices from occurring on the securities mar
kets. 77 Prior to its passage, securities prices were subject to "manipu
lation and control,"78 resulting in "sudden and unreasonable" price
fluctuations. 79 This caused a myriad of valuation problems affecting
not only securities owners, but businesses and government entities as
well. 80 The Exchange Act established the Securities and Exchange
securities markets. Gadsby, supra note 70, at 8. Furthermore, in the 1920s, securities regu
lation received little public interest. W. ATKINS, G. EDWARDS & H. MOULTON, supra
note 69, at 45. Legislators found little public support for securities legislation due to the
widespread availability of credit, a booming stock market, and because "rags to riches
[was) the theme of the day." Gadsby, supra note 70, at 7.
73. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77bbbb (1988».
The Securities Act of 1933 primarily regulates the issuance of securities. W. ATKINS,
G. EDWARDS & H. MOULTON, supra note 69, at 57; Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 215 (1959).
74. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-1I (1988».
"The Securities Act and the Exchange Act constitute virtually the entire body of gen
eral [federal) securities regulation." L. SODERQUIST, supra note 71, at 3.
75. The purpose ofthe Securities Act of 1933 is "to provide full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold ... and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
The purpose of the Exchange Act is "to provide for the regulation of securities ex
changes and of over-the-counter markets ... [and) to prevent inequitable and unfair prac
tices on such exchanges and markets." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1934).
In a 1963 report to Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission observed that
"[t)he keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities legislation is disclosure. Making
available to investors adequate financial and other information about securities in which
they might invest or have invested is the best means ... of protecting them against securi
ties fraud." SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SE
CURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1 (1963) [hereinafter SEcURmES MARKETS REPORT).
76. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-1I (1988».
77. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 1838, supra note 75, at 1. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 regulates trading in securities that occurs after issuance. W. ATKINS, G. EDWARDS &
H. MOULTON, supra note 69, at 66; Loomis, supra note 73, at 215.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1988).
79. Id. For an overview of stock exchange practices prior to and during the early
1930s, see S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3) (1988). In a letter to Congress recommending legislation
which would regulate the securities exchanges, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:
[Naked) speculation has run the scale from the individual who has risked his
pay envelop or his meager savings on a margin transaction involving stocks with

1991]

THIRD PARTY STANDING & THE ALL-HOLDERS RULE

75

Commission;81 provided for margin requirements;82 restricted borrow
ing and lending by national securities exchange members, brokers, and
dealers;83 prohibited security price manipulation;84 instituted report
ing requirements by security issuers;85 and regulated the use of prox
ies,86 among other things. 87
While the Exchange Act has been called a "remarkable legislative
achievement,"88 amendments have been required to perpetuate its ef
fectiveness. 89 By the mid-1960s, it had been amended eleven times. 90
Despite this extensive legislation, disclosure of information in connec
whose true value he was wholly unfamiliar, to the pool of individuals or corpora
tions with large resources, often not their own, which sought by manipulation to
raise or depress market quotations far out of line with reason, all of this resulting
in loss to the average investor, who is of necessity personally uninformed.
H.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); S. REp. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
2 (1934).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988). Section 23(a) of the Exchange Act empowered the Se
curities and Exchange Commission to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for im
plementing the Act's provisions. See id. § 78w(a).
82. Id. § 78g. "Margin" is the amount of credit extended to purchase or maintain a
position in a security. See id.; see also WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIC
TIONARY 1100 (2d ed. 1983) ("Margin" is "speculation in which the broker advances part
of the money, with reservations to protect him against loss, and the buyer deposits the rest,
taking the profit and loss on fluctuations in value.").
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78h (1988).
84. Id. § 78i.
85. Id. § 78m.
86. Id. § 78n.
87. See generally id. §§ 78a-lI.
88. SEcuRmES MARKETS REPORT, supra note 75, pt. 1, at xv (letter of transmittal
accompanying report); cf Aranow & Einhorn, Proxy Regulation: Suggested Improvements,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 306, 309-10 (1959) (The proxy rules promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the authority granted by the Exchange Act "have
wrought wonders" and "have produced light where before there was darkness. ").
89. SEcuRmES MARKETS REPORT, supra note 75, pt. 1, at xv (letter of transmittal
accompanying report); cf Loomis, supra note 73, at 219 (discussing the "considerable revi
sion" which has been necessary in the regulation of the over-the-counter markets.).
90. The amendments are:
Act of May 27, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-621, 49 Stat. 1375.
Act of June 25, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070.
Act of Mar. 17, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-258, 58 Stat. 117.
Act of Aug. 10, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-577, §§ 201-202, 68 Stat. 683, 686.
Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-791, § 10, 72 Stat. 941, 945.
Act of July 12, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-619, § 3,74 Stat. 407, 408.
Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-771,74 Stat. 913.
Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-196, 75 Stat. 465.
Act of July 27, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-561,76 Stat. 247.
Act of Aug. 20, 1962, P~b. L. No. 87-592, 76 Stat. 394.
Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, §§ 1-11,78 Stat. 565, 565-80.
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tion with cash tender offers91 was inadequate. 92
Cash tender offer activity had increased dramatically,93 from
eight offers for publicly traded companies on national securities ex
changes in 1960 to 107 offers in 1966. 94 The dollar amount involved
in the offers had increased fivefold in five years, to approximately $1
billion in 1965. 95 Tender offerors used high-pressure tactics to acquire
companies. 96 They acted under a "cloak of secrecy"97 as no require
ments for disclosure to shareholders or filing of information existed. 98
91. The House of Representatives defined "cash tender offer" as follows:
The [cash tender] offer normally consists of a bid by an individual or group to buy
shares of a company-usually at a price above the current market price. Those
accepting the offer are said to tender their stock for purchase. The person making
the offer obligates himself to purchase all or a specified portion of the tendered
shares if certain specified conditions are met.
H.R. REp. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CONGo & AD
MIN. NEWS 2811, 2811; S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); see also ENCYCLO
PEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 922 (G. Munn & F. Garcia 8th ed. 1983).
92. H.R. REp. No. 1711, supra note 91, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812; S. REP. No. 550, supra note 91, at 2.
93. Cash tender offers increased because they were cheaper than proxy fights, a de
feated offeror might be able to dispose of its stock without a loss, the offeror had control of
both length of time of the offer and secrecy of the operation, and no specific cash tender
offer regulation existed. See L. Loss, supra note 69, at 498.
For a discussion of why cash was preferred over other forms of compensation, see L.
Loss, supra note 69, at 498-99.
94. Full Disclosure 0/ Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids.
Hearings on S. 510 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Securities o/the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Cu"ency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1967) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 510]; H.R. REP. No.
1711, supra note 91, at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811,
2812; S. REP. No. 550, supra note 91, at 2; 113 CoNG. REC. 24,664 (1967).
95. Hearings on S. 510, supra note 94, at 17 (testimony of Manuel F. Cohen, Chair
man, Securities and Exchange Commission); Takeover Bids, Hearings on H.R. 14475. S.
510 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance o/the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chair
man, Securities and Exchange Commission); 113 CONGo REC. 24,664 (1967).
96. See 113 CoNG. REc. 857-58 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel, cosponsor of bill).
One commentator has stated "the legal regime was one of caveat vendor." DeMott, supra
note 2, at 404.
97. 113 CONGo REC. 858 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel, cosponsor of bill); see id.
at 24,664-65 (statement of Sen. Williams, cosponsor of bill); id. at 9338 (statement of Sen.
Kuchel, cosponsor of bill).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 91, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813; S. REp. No. 550, supra note 91, at 3.
A disparity in filing and disclosure requirements existed among methods in which
corporate control was sought. Proxy contests and exchange offers required that sharehold
ers receive certain information about the offer and the acquiror. Exchange offers had to be
registered and in both methods, information had to be filed with the Securities and Ex
change Commission. In contrast, cash tender offers were not subject to these requirements.
See H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 91, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD
MIN. NEWS 2811,2812-13; S. REP. No. 550, supra note 91, at 3.
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In 1968, Congress reacted to the need for cash tender offer legisla
tion by passing the Williams Act,99 which amended sections 12, 13,
and 14 of the Exchange Act. loo The Williams Act was "the congres
sional response to the increased use of cash tender offers in corporate
acquisitions, a device that had 'removed a substantial number of cor
porate control contests from the reach of existing disclosure require
ments of the federal securities laws.' "101 The Williams Act and the
resulting Securities and Exchange Commission reguiations lO2 imposed
substantive disclosure requirements and established procedural rules
governing tender offers. 103
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, cosponsor of the Wil
liams Act, stated that the purpose of the Act was "solely to require full
and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors."I04 Senator Williams
also commented that it would "close a significant gap in investor pro
tection ... by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information,"los
and that the thrust of the legislation was "to protect shareholders and
give them the information necessary to make an intelligent deci
sion." 106 Congress designed the Act to require "full and fair disclo
sure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the
offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
case." 107
The United States Supreme Court has reiterated that disclosure
and investor protection are the focal points of the Williams Act. The
99. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
100. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 12-14, 48 Stat. 881,
892-95 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78/-n (1988».
The amendment to section 12 struck out "sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), and 16" in
section 12(i) and inserted "sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f), and 16" in its place.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78/(i) (1988).
Section 13 was amended by adding new subsections (d) and (e). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)-(e) (1988).
Section 14 was amended by adding new subsections (d), (e), and (f). See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
101. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977».
102. The Williams Act granted rulemaking authority to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to enforce its provisions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78/-n (1988). Additionally, section
23(a) of the Exchange Act empowers the Commission to adopt rules and regulations neces
sary to the implementation of its provisions. See id. § 78w(a).
103. See id. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f).
104. See 113 CoNG. REc. 24,664 (1967).
105. Id. at 854.
106. Id. at 9340.
107. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 91, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813; S. REp. No. 550, supra note 91, at 3; see also 113 CONGo REC.
854-55 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams, cosponsor of bill).
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Court has stated that "Congress relied primarily on disclosure to im
plement the purpose ofthe Williams Act ... [which is] 'to insure that
public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their
stock will not be required to respond without adequate informa
tion.' "108 More recently, the Court has held that a basic purpose of
the Williams Act is " 'plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the
takeover bidder,' ".1 09
Section 13 of the Williams Act llO requires persons who accumu
late more than five percent of any class of equity security I II registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act 1l2 to file information with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the stock exchange on which
the security is traded, and the issuer of the security.1l3 This informa
tion must identify the person on whose behalf the purchases have been
made, I 14 the source and amount of funds used, II' the amount of funds
borrowed and the lender,1l6 the purpose of the purchases,117 the
108. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975».
The Court has stated that the Act's sole purpose was the protection of investors con
fronted with a tender offer. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977); see also
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) ("[I]n imposing [the Williams Act] require
ments, Congress intended to protect investors."). One commentator has noted that the
legislative history of the Williams Act indicates this view is more restrictive than was in
tended. See M. STEINBERG, CoRPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 200 (1983).
109. crs Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 82 (1987) (quoting
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (quoting the Senate Report accompany
ing the Williams Act, S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967»).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988).
111. In the Exchange Act, Congress defined "equity security" as follows:
The term "equity security" means any stock or similar security; or any se
curity convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying
any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such
warrant or right; or any other security which the Commission shall deem to be of
similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regula
tions as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to
treat as an equity security.
Id § 78c(a)(II).
Section 13 of the Williams Act required disclosure by ten percent acquirors. See Pub.
L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 454 (1968). However, a 1970 amendment to the Exchange Act
lowered the threshold to five percent. See Act of Dec. 22,1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1,84
Stat. 1497, 1497 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I) (1988».
112. Section 12 of the Exchange Act imposed registration requirements for securities
traded on national exchanges. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988).
lB. Id. § 78m(d). A number of qualifications and exceptions to this basic require
ment exist. See id § 78m(d)(2)-(5).
114. Id § 78m(d)(l)(A).
115. Id. § 78m(d)(1)(B).
116. Id. If a loan is made by a bank in the ordinary course of business, the bank
need not be identified if the person filing the statement so requests. Id.
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number of shares owned,118 and any arrangements or contracts with
anyone regarding the securities. 1l9 Section 13 also governs issuer
repurchases. 120
Section 14 of the Williams Act 121 regulates tender offers.1 22 In
order to make a bid, beneficial owners of more than five percent of any
class of equity security123 registered under section 12 of the Exchange
Act 124 must disclose the same information specified in section 13.125
Additionally, the statement must include requests for tenders.1 26 If
directors are to be elected or designated at other than a meeting of
stockholders, the offeror must provide specific information to share
holders and the Securities and Exchange Commission. 127 False state
ments or omissions of material facts regarding a tender offer are
prohibited. 128 Section 14 also controls the tender offer process, al
lowing for the withdrawal of tendered securities 129 and for pro rata
payment for an oversubscribed offer. 130 If an offeror increases the con
sideration offered for the securities, the increase must be paid to all
tendering security holders. l3l
117. Id. § 78m(d)(I)(C).
Id. § 78m(d)(1)(D).
Id. § 78m(d)(I)(E).
Id. § 78m(e). Section 13 primarily grants power to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to regulate issuer repurchases. See id.
121. Id. § 78n.
.
122. See id.
123. Section 14 of the Williams Act required disclosure by ten percent acquirors.
See Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, 456 (1968). However, a 1970 amendment to the
Exchange Act lowered the threshold to five percent. See Act ofOec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-567, § 3, 84 Stat. 1497, 1497 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(I) (1988».
124. Section 12 of the Exchange Act imposed registration requirements for securities
traded on national exchanges. See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988).
125. Id. § 78m. A number of qualifications and exceptions to this basic requirement
exist. See id. § 78n(d)(2)-(4), 78n(d)(8).
126. Id. § 78n(d)(1).
127. Id. § 78n(f). This requirement applies to section 13(d) also. Id. The informa
tion must be substantially equivalent to that required by sections l4(a) or l4(c). Id. Those
sections allow the Securities and Exchange Commission to prescribe what is required. See
. id. § 78n(a), 78n(c).
128. Id. § 78n(e).
129. Id. § 78n(d)(5). Securities may be withdrawn within seven days after the first
definitive publication of the offer or at any time after sixty days from the date of the original
offer. Id.
130. Id. § 78n(d)(6). An "oversubscribed offer" occurs if the tender offer is for less
than all the outstanding equity securities of a class, but security holders deposit greater
than that number of securities. See id. If this situation results, the offeror must purchase
the securities on a pro rata basis if they were tendered within the first ten days after the
offer was published. Id. The same ten day rule applies to securities tendered after notice of
an increase in consideration is first published. Id.
131. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
118.
119.
120.
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The disclosure and investor protection requirements of sections
13 and 14 provided the substantive basis for the Securities and Ex
change Commission's adoption of the All-Holders Rule. 132

B.

The All-Holders Rule

In 1986, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commis
sion") promulgated the All-Holders Rule l33 under the authority of the
Williams Act Amendments l34 and the Exchange Act. 135 Prior to
1986, the Commission had proposed equal treatment of security hold
ers 136 by both third parties l37 and issuers 138 to preclude discrimination
132. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14d-10(a)(I) (1990) (regarding third party tender offers); id.
§ 240. 13e-4(f)(8)(i) (regarding issuer tender offers); see Amendments to Rules, supra note
65, at 88,188-91.
Rule 14d-10(a)(I), adopted as a new rule, applies to third party tender offers and is
referred to as the All-Holders Rule. See generally Amendments to Rules, supra note 65.
However, the Commission simultaneously proposed and ultimately codified the require
ment that an issuer's tender offer must also be open to all holders of that class of securities.
See id. at 88,187; Tender Offers By Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 22,199, [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1] 83,798 (July I, 1985) (proposed Rule 13e
4(f)(8)(i». This resulted in an amendment to Rule 13. Amendments to Rules, supra note
65, at 88,187 (regarding Rule 13e-4(f)(8)(i».
133. 17 C.F.R. § 24O.14d-IO(a)(1) (1990).
134. IS U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988). The Commission did not cite sec
tion 12 as authority or as being part of the Williams Act Amendments. See Amendments
to Rules, supra note 65, at 88,188.
The Commission specifically cited subsections 13(e), 14(d), and 14(e) as vesting au
thority in it to promulgate the All-Holders Rule. See id.
135. IS U.S.C. §§ 78a-1I (1988). The Commission claimed authority to promulgate
the All-Holders Rule under sections 3(b) and 23(a), the enabling provisions of the Ex
change Act. Amendments to Rules, supra note 65; see also supra note 81. See generally 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78w(a) (1988).
The Commission also adopted the All-Holders Rule under section 23(c) of the Invest
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23c, and sections 9(a)(6) and 1O(b) of the
Exchange Act, IS U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(6), 78j(b). Amendments to Rules, supra note 65, at
88,188 n.15. See generally IS U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(6), 78j(b), 80a-23c (1988).
136. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
16,385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1] 82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979)
[hereinafter Proposed Tender Offer Amendments] (proposed Rule 14e-4(b), regarding third
party and issuer tender offers); Notice of Proposed Rule 13e-4 and Schedule 13E-4 under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 14,234, [1977-1978 Trans
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1]81,380, at 88,785 (Dec. 7, 1977) (proposed Rule 13e
4(b)(4), regarding issuer tender offers).
137. For purposes of sections 14(d) and 14(e) ofthe Exchange Act of 1934, the term
"third party" is vicariously defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 17
C.F.R. § 24O.14d-I(b)(I), which provides that: "The term 'bidder' means any person who
makes a tender offer or on whose behalf a tender offer is made: Provided. however. That the
term does not include an issuer which makes a tender offer for securities of any class of
which it is the issuer." 17 C.F.R. § 24O.14d-1(b)(1) (1990).
138. "Issuer" is defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission as "any issuer
which has a class of equity security registered pursuant to section 12 of the [Exchange] Act,

1991]

THIRD PARTY STANDING & THE ALL-HOLDERS RULE

81

in tender offers, but it did not act until prompted by the decision in
Unocal Corp. v. Pickens. 139 Responding to a self-tender offer in which
Unocal Corp. excluded the block of its shares held by Mesa Petroleum
or which is required to file periodic reports pursuant to section 15(d) of the [Exchange]
Act, or which is a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Com
pany Act of 1940." 17 C.F.R. § 24O.13e-4(a)(I) (1990).
The Commission defines "issuer tender offer" as "a tender offer for, or a request or
invitation for tenders of, any class of equity security, made by the issuer of such class of
equity security or by an affiliate of such issuer." Id. § 240. 13e-4(a)(2).
139. 608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
In 1985, corporate raider T. Boone Pickens, via his Mesa Petroleum Co. and its affili
ates, launched a front-end loaded, two-tiered takeover bid for Unocal Corporation's out
standing stock. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985).
Mesa, owner of about 13% of the stock, proposed to acquire an additional 37% for $54.00
cash per share (the "front-end") and purchase the remaining 49% for $54.00 per share of
highly leveraged subordinated debt (the "back-end"). Id.
In response to a bid that it felt was grossly inadequate, Unocal's board of directors
approved a discriminatory self-tender offer, open to all its shareholders except Mesa, offer
ing $72.00 per share in exchange for a package of debt securities. Id. at 950-51.
Mesa sued in the Delaware Chancery Court to enjoin its exclusion from the Unocal
offer. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal Corp., No. 7997, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1985).
The court issued a preliminary injunction based on Mesa's argument that the self-tender
was unlawful under Delaware law because it was discriminatory. Id. at 8-9. However,
Mesa also sought an injunction under federal securities law in the District Court for the
Central District of California. Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. Cal.
1985).
The district court decided in favor of Unocal. Id. It stated that while the Securities
and Exchange Commission had twice proposed rulemaking that would have required
tender offers to be open to all holders, its failure to adopt these rules indicated that the
Commission felt the proposals were either outside the scope of the Williams Act or they
were not required as a matter of policy. Id. at 1082. The court denied Mesa's motion for a
preliminary injunction preventing Unocal from completing its self-tender offer unless it was
open to all holders. Id. at 1083. It held that Mesa had failed to show irreparable harm and
was unlikely to succeed on its claim that the Williams Act prohibited discriminatory tender
offers. Id. (The court defined discriminatory tender offers as "offers to less than all persons
who hold the class of securities which are the subject of the offer.").
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Delaware vacated the Chancery Court's preliminary
injunction, holding that Unocal's self-tender was not discriminatory despite its exclusion of
Mesa. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,957 (Del. 1985). Thus, Unoca1
was successful in fending off Pickens. Rose, Cohen & Stewart, Unocal. Mesa Group Reach
Pact To End Takeover Battle for Firm, Wall St. J., May 21, 1985, at 2, col. 2 (Mesa and
Unocal reached a settlement whereby Unocal agreed to allow Mesa to partially participate
in the Unocal offer. In return, Mesa agreed to sell its remaining shares and not purchase
any additional Unocal stock for 25 years.).
For further discussion of the Commission's response to the Unocal decision, see Di
vided SEC Adopts 'Ali-Holders' Rule in Response to Decision in Unocal Case, 18 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 997-98 (July 11, 1986) [hereinafter Divided SEC]; Proposed
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 22,198, [1984-1985 Trans
fer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 83,797, at 87,560 & n.5 (July I, 1985) [hereinafter
Proposed Amendments].
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Co.,t40 the Commission 141 proposed the All-Holders Rule 142 and an
amendment to Rule 13e_4 143 requiring both third party and issuer
tender offers to be open to all holders of the class of securities subject
to the offer.l44 This response came although the Commission had
unofficially supported the all-holders requirement since the enactment
of the Williams Act and its position was "a widely known and gener
ally accepted tender offer practice."14s
The All-Holders Rule states that "[n]o bidder shall make a tender
offer unless ... [t]he tender offer is open to all security holders of the
class of securities subject to the tender offer."l46 While nothing in the
140. See supra note 139.
141. The Commission felt that the exclusionary tender offer was discriminatory and
a violation of the Williams Act. Wall St. J., June 24, 1985, at 2, col. 3 (quoting an internal
Commission memo).
142. Proposed Amendments, supra note 139, at 87,560; see Divided SEC, supra note
139, at 997-98.
143. Tender Offers By Issuers, supra note 132.
144. In addition to proposing a ban on discriminatory tender offers by third parties
and issuers, both Exchange Act Release No. 22,198 (proposed Amendments, supra note
139) and Exchange Act Release No. 22,199 (Tender Offers By Issuers, supra note 132) also
advanced a Best-Price Rule, requiring that all shareholders be paid the highest considera
tion offered to any other shareholder at any time during the tender offer. Both releases also
proposed minimum periods during which tender offers must remain open. The Commis
sion adopted the amendments substantially as proposed. See Amendments to Rules, supra
note 65.
145. Proposed Amendments, supra note 139, at 87,560.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 24O.14d-lO(a)(1) (1990). The Commission created several excep
tions to the All-Holders Rule:
(1) If by administrative or judicial action taken pursuant to a constitutionally valid
antitakeover statute, a state bars the making of a tender offer, then a third party or issuer
may exclude security holders in that state if a good faith attempt is made to comply with
the law. Id § 24O.14d-lO(b)(2) (regarding third party tender offers); id. § 24O.13e
4(f)(9)(ii) (regarding issuer tender offers). The third party or issuer may offer an alterna
tive form of consideration to security holders in that state, but is not required to do so.
Amendments to Rules, supra note 65, at 88,193. To meet the good faith requirement, the
third party or issuer need not modify the terms of the consideration or the offer, but must
only make the required filing and pay the required fee. Id.
(2) Tender offers by foreign citizens made without the use of the mails, the instru
mentalities of interstate commerce, or a national securities exchange facility are exempt
from the all-holders requirement. See id. at 88,192. The proposed new Rule 14d-10 and
amendment to Rule 13e-4(f) had each included exemptions from the all-holders require
ment for foreign bidders. See Proposed Amendments to SEC Tender Offer Rules, 17 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (DNA) No. 28, at 1320, 1324 (July 12, 1985) (regarding third party tender
offers); Proposed SEC Rule on Tender Offers By Issuers, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (DNA) No.
28, at 1310, 1319 (July 12, 1985) (regarding issuer tender offers). However, the Commis
sion, in the belief that the law was clear in this area due to the decision in Plessey Co. PLC
v. General Electric Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986), deleted the proposed provi
sions as unnecessary. See Amendments to Rules, supra note 65, at 88,192.
(3) Issuers can limit offers to shareholders owning only odd-lots of its securities. 17
C.F.R. § 24O.13e-4(g)(5) (1990). An "odd-lot" is an aggregate of shares that is less than

199i]

THIRD PARTY STANDING & THE ALL-HOLDERS RULE

83

text of the Williams Act or its legislative history expressly dealt with
this subject,147 the Commission construed the Act as implicitly requir
ing that security holders be treated equally when a tender offer is
made. 148 The Commission determined that the Williams Act's disclo
sure objectives would be pointless if information was divulged to all
holders, but only some could participate in an offer,149 because disclo
sure was designed to make information known so that "shareholders
have a fair opportunity to make their decision" to tender, sell or hold
their securities. ISO
Disclosure was an issue in Polaroid's attempt to ward off Sham
rock, lSI but Shamrock's misrepresentations were correctable. ls2 How
ever, the determination that Polaroid lacked standing to assert an All
Holders Rule claim ended Polaroid's attempts to receive preliminary
injunctive relief on that basis.ls3
one hundred. See Amendments to Rules, supra note 65, at 88,194. The Commission stated
that "the purpose of an odd-lot offer is to reduce the high costs to the issuer of servicing
large numbers of small security holder accounts, and to enable those security holders to
dispose of their shares without incurring the brokerage fees that normally attend odd-lot
transactions." Id. The Commission adopted the exception "[b]ecause odd-lot offers pres
ent 'minimal potential for fraud and manipulation ... .'.. Id. However, the all-holders
requirement applies within the odd-lot offer: an issuer must extend the offer to all security
holders holding the specified number, or fewer, shares. Id. at 88,194-95.
(4) Issuers can offer to repurchase securities only from shareholders whose securities
may have .been issued in violation of state law or the registration provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 13e-4(gX6) (1990). Issuers normally would not make such
rescission offers if required to extend the offer to all holders of the class of security subject
to the offer. See Tender Offers By Issuers, supra note 132, at 87,575.
(5) A particular transaction may be exempted from the All-Holders Rule through a
determination by the Commission on written request or by its own motion. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 14d-lO(e) (1990) (regarding third party tender offers); id. § 240.13e-4(gX7) (regard
ing issuer tender offers).
The Commission has entertained ideas about other possible exemptions to the all-hold
ers requirement. See Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control:
Advance Notice of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 84,018 (July 31, 1986) (whether a
self-governance exemption to the All-Holders Rule and other tender offer regulations
should be adopted); Commission Issues Concept Release on Poison Pills, Opt-Outs, Williams
Act, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1157-58 (Aug. 8, 1986).
147. Unoca1 Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
148. Proposed Amendments, supra note 139, at 87,560; Proposed Tender Offer
Amendments, supra note 136, at 82,610.
149. Amendments to Rules, supra note 65, at 88,189.
150. Id. at 88,189 n.23 (quoting S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967».
151. See Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1003 (3d Cir. 1988).
152. See id. at 1007.

153. See id.
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STANDING

Standing doctrine is both confusing and amorphous. 1S4 As Jus
tice Douglas stated, "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as SUCh."lSS Polaroid Corp. v. Disney,lS6 with its fo
cus on third party and associational standing, exemplifies the contin
ued difficulty in this area.
A.

Definition and Summary of Requirements

Standing is a determination of "whether the litigant is entitled to
have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular is
sues."lS7 The litigant must have a "sufficient stake in a[ ] ... contro
versy to obtain judicial resolution of [it]."lS8 In the absence of a
statute, this personal interest is required "to ensure that 'the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and
in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.' "lS9 In
essence, the question of standing focuses on whether the plaintiff is the
proper party to litigate the dispute. l60
There are three constitutional and three prudential limitations on
154. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been
defined with complete consistency"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (standing
called one of "the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law" (quoting
Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary
Comm, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund»); Fletcher,
The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988) (standing law long criticized as
incoherent); Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation ofPowers Analysis, 1984 WIS.
L. REV. 37, 37 ("Few judicial doctrines have generated as much ... doctrinal confusion as
standing ...."); cf C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS § 13, at 60 (4th ed. 1983)
("The law of standing has experienced rapid and repeated change in the years since
1968.").
155. Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. V. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970).
156. 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
157. Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
158. Sierra Club V. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
159. Id. at 732 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968».
The raison d'ctre of a case is rooted in an adversarial relationship between the liti
gants. "[A] real dispute [must] exist[ ] between the prospective parties in a suit. ... The
federal courts are thus unable to respond to hypothetical or friendly suits, and they cannot
render advisory opinions." R. CHANDLER, R. ENSLEN & P. RENSTROM, CoNSTITU
TIONAL LAW DESKBOOK § 8:107, at 544 (1987).
160. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. V. United States AtOlnic Energy Comm'n,
431 F. Supp. 203, 219 (W.D.N.C. 1977), rev'd sub nom Duke Power Co. V. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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standing. 161 Federal jurisdiction 162 is restricted to cases which satisfy
all six requirements. 163 Under article III, section 2, clause 1 of the
Constitution,l64 a litigant, to comply with the constitutional prerequi
sites for standing, must show an actual or threatened injury,165 which
is traceable to the defendant's conduct,166 and is likely to be redressed
by a favorable federal court decision. 167 Thus, the plaintiff must allege
injury in fact, causation, and redressability.168
161. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982).
162. "Article III of the Constitution limits the 'judicial power' of the United States
to the resolution of 'cases' and 'controversies.''' Id. at 471. The litigant must make out a
" 'case or controversy' between himself and the defendant" in order for a federal court to
entertain the lawsuit. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The litigant fulfills this
requirement by complying with the constitutional limitations on standing. See Valley Forge
Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
163. E. CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1, at 51 (1989). Congress
may supersede the prudential requirements by conferring standing by statute where it
would not otherwise exist. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41
n.22 (1976); Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3
(1973». Professor Fallon suggests that Congress' power to repudiate prudential require
ments may be limited. See Fallon, Of Justiciability. Remedies. and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 30-35, 47-48, 56-59 (1984).
Congress cannot supersede the constitutional limitations. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 41 n.22.
The prudential requirements may also be judicially superseded. See infra note 170.
Questions of standing in state courts are governed by state law. G. GUNTHER, CoN
STITUTIONAL LAW 1576 (11th ed. 1985). State court standing requirements "may and
frequently do differ from federal court standing rules." Id. The United States Supreme
Court stated in ASARCO:
[T]he constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the
state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other
federal rules ofjusticiability even when they address issues of federal law, as when
they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or ... a federal statute.
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
164. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III, section 2, clause 1 states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Ju
risdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of an
other State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
165. See. e.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979);
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
166. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
167. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Simon, 426 U.S. at 38.
168. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-14, at 108 (2d ed. 1988); see
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The three prudential limitations are not constitutionally based,169
and thus, they may be statutorily or judicially repudiated. 170 First, a
litigant who, as a citizen or taxpayer, asserts a generalized grievance
"shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citi
zens"171 lacks standing, where the injury asserted is that the govern
ment failed to follow the law.172 A generalized grievance is in the
domain of the United States Congress and, ultimately, the political
process must address the particular subject matter the grievance
concerns. 173
Second, a litigant's claim must fall within the zone of interests
protected by the statute at issue. 174 That is, the litigant must be part
of the group that is the intended beneficiary of the law. 17S
Finally, the third prudential requirement for standing is that the
rights one asserts must be one's own - a litigant may not champion
the rights of another not a party to the litigation. 176 Thus, third party
standing· is normally prohibited. 177
also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &. State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982).
169. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.1, at 52.
170. Id. (regarding statutorily repudiated prudential requirements). Judicially repu
diated prudential requirements include the exceptions to third party standing which the
United States Supreme Court has carved out. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying
text.
171. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
172. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)
(Plaintiffs, as U.S. citizens, lacked standing to sue because they had a generalized grievance
common to all citizens, and lacked concrete injury.); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 174 (1974) ("[A] taxpayer may not 'employ a federal court as a forum in which to air
his generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in
the Federal System.' " (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 114 (1968) (Stewart, J., con
curring»); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam) (A private individual may not
invoke judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action unless he
has sustained or is threatened by a direct injury; a mere general interest common to all
members of the public is not sufficient.).
173. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179.
174. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
175. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.6, at 84. The zone of interest test ap
plies when the litigant challenges an administrative agency regulation that "does not di
rectly control the [litigant's] ... actions." Id. The test may be limited to claims in which
review of agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act is sought. See Clarke
v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 n.16 (1987). In Clarke, the United States
Supreme Court stated "the test is most usefully understood as a gloss on the meaning of
§ 702 [which authorizes judicial review of agency action]." Id.; see also Administrative
Procedure Act § 702, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). The test is not one "of universal application."
Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16.
176. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975).
177. See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text.
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Third Party Standing

The Supreme Court has stated that a litigant "must assert his
own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim [on those] ...
of third parties."178 When a litigant seeks to have third party, or jus
tertii,179 standing, the Court has indicated that three elements must be
examined to determine the litigant's authority to do so. 180 The first is
the relationship between the litigant and the third party.t 81 A close
relationship between the litigant and the third party must exist so that
the litigant is "very nearly[ ] as effective a proponent of the right" as
the third party.182 The second element is the third party's ability to
assert its own rights. 183 The third party must be genuinely unable to
raise its own rights. l84 The third element that must be examined is the
impact of the litigation on the third party's interests. 18S The issue be
ing litigated must materially impair the third party's ability to assert
its rightS. 186
Generally, a litigant does not have third party standing l87 for
three reasons. 188 First, rights should not be unnecessarily adjudi
178. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
179. See Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 CoWM. L. REv. 277, 278 n.6 (1984)
("Third party standing" is becoming a synonym for "jus tertii standing."); Note, Associa
tional Standing and Due Process: The Need for an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61
B.U.L. REv. 174, 176 n.17 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Associational Standing].
180. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646, 2651 n.3
(1989).
181. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976).
182. Id. at 115; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,481 (1965) (rights of
married couples, as third parties, likely to be adversely affected unless asserted in suit by
Planned Parenthood officials in confidential relationship with them).
183. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115-16.
184. See id.; see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (third parties'
assertion of right would result in loss of that right); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257
(1953) (covenantor cOuld maintain third party standing where it would be difficult if not
impossible for third parties to present their grievance before any court).
185. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972).
186. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196 (1976) (enforcement of statutes at issue
would materially impair ability of males aged 18-20 to purchase 3.2% beer); Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 446 (enforcement of statute would materially impair ability of single persons to
obtain contraceptives).
187. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114; Barrows, 346 U.S. at 255; see B. SCHWARTZ, CON
STITUTIONAL LAW § 1.17, at 39 (2d ed. 1979); Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus
Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1308, 1309 (1982) [hereinafter Sedler,
The Assertion]; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,99 n.20 (1968); McGowan v. Mary
land, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961); cf Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1962) ("[T]o say that standing to assert the rights
of third parties is denied more often than not sheds no real light on the problem. ").
188. For a view that the reasoning behind third party standing doctrine is unjustifi
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cated. 189 If a third party does not wish to assert a right l90 or will be
able to enjoy the right regardless of the outcome of an in-court liti
gant's lawsuit,191 a prohibition against third party standing fosters ju
dicial economy in that a question of law will not be decided in advance
of the necessity of doing SO.192 Second, third parties are generally the
most effective advocates of their own rights. 193 Prohibiting third party
standing promotes superior litigation and judicial decision-making l94
because the champions of the right themselves are before the court. 19S
Finally, where the litigant who asserts third party standing receives an
unfavorable decision, a third party's ability to advance its own rights
may be undermined by the doctrine of stare decisis 196 or, to a lesser
extent, be injured by unfavorable precedent. 197
Despite the general proscription against third party standing, a
number of exceptions to the rule exist. 198 Where first amendment
rights are at issue, a litigant may challenge a law on a third party
able, see Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Stand
ing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393,405-06 (1981).
189. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113.
190. [d. at 113-14; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S.
59, 80 (1978).
191. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
192. See generally id.; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960) ("[A]p
plication of this rule [prohibiting third party standing] frees the Court not only from unnec
essary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of
statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy."); Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (regarding unnecessary consti
tutional law adjudication).
193. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114; see, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898)
(argument that third party employees' rights violation has "greater cogency" if self
asserted).
194. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (personal stake in outcome of contro
versy assures concrete adverseness which sharpens presentation of issues upon which court
depends); E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.4, at 72.
195. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80
(1978); R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.13(f)(3), at 140 (1986).
196. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
197. Rohr, supra note 188, at 405. Professor Rohr also opposes third party standing
in cases where a concrete factual situation does not exist. Id. at 463.
198. See generally E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.4; L. TRIBE, supra note
168, § 3-19; Rohr, supra note 188; Sedler, The Assertion, supra note 187; Note, Standing to
Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
The prohibition against third party standing has been described as being "riddled with
exceptions." Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations By Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 247, 280
(1988).
A litigant asserting third party standing still must satisfy the constitutional standing
requirements. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.4, at 73.

1991]

THIRD PARTY STANDING & THE ALL-HOLDERS RULE

89

standing basis by claiming that, while the law does not constitutionally
curtail the litigant's rights, it does violate the rights of absent third
parties. 199 The purpose of this exception, known as the overbreadth
doctrine,2oo is to avoid laws that have a chilling effect on constitution
ally protected speech or expression. 201 The Supreme Court has em
phasized that the existence of a law that might chill first amendment
rights outweighs potential pitfalls resulting from third party
standing.202
A litigant may also advance the rights of another not before the
court if the litigant is an adequate representative of an absent party
who is unable to assert those rights. Such instances occur when the
third parties cannot legally be a party to an action 203 and thus, are
"denied a forum in which to assert their own rights."204 Litigants are
accorded third party standing in such cases so that third parties' inter
ests are protected. 20s
A special or close relationship between the litigant and the third
party allows for third party standing. In such circumstances, the liti
gant is granted third party standing where a connection exists between
the litigant and the third party's exercise of a protected activity.206
199. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980);
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
200. Several scholars have argued that the overbreadth doctrine is distinct in itself
and not an exception to third party standing proscriptions. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK
& J. YOUNG, supra note 195, § 2.l3(f)(3), at 140-41; L. TRIBE, supra note 168, § 3-19, at
135 n.7; Fletcher, supra note 154, at 244; Monaghan, supra note 179, at 282-86; see also E.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.4, at 76 n.153.
201. Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984);
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612; see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
202. See Munson, 467 U.S. at 956-57 ("[W]hen there is a danger of chilling free
speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible may be
outweighed by society's interest in having the statute challenged."). See generally
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610-13.
In an overbreadth situation, a court will not weigh the third party's ability to assert its
own claims. Munson, 467 U.S. at 957; see also supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
203. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (defendant had standing to assert
interests of unmarried persons where latter were denied access to contraceptives, but were
unable to assert their own rights because they were not subject to prosecution); Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (covenantor was proper party to represent rights of non
Caucasians unable to assert their own rights because they were not parties to contract at
issue); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (vendor had third party standing to
assert rights of vendees, males aged 18-20, refused access to 3.2% beer but not subject to
prosecution under law because statute regulated sale, not use, of beer).
204. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446.
205. Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257; see Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 445-46.
206. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.4, at 74.
Professor Monaghan has urged that an investigation of a close relationship should
focus on whether restrictions hamper the interaction between the litigant and the third
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Courts have found close relationships between school and student,207
physician and patient,208 and vendor and vendee,209 among others. 210
Finally, an organization or association may be'permitted to have
third party standing to assert the rights of its members. 211
C.

Associational Standing

While an association has standing to seek judicial relief in its own
right if, as an entity, it has suffered injury,212 it may also have standing
party. Cf Monaghan, supra note 179, at 299 (contending that where restrictions encumber
the relationship, the litigant asserts his own, not third party, rights).
Professor Chemerinsky has stated "a close relationship is not enough for third-party
standing; the advocate also must be part of the third party's exercise of the protected
right." E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.4, at 75 (construing Gilmore v. Utah, 429
U.S. 1012 (1976), as potentially supporting this proposition). Compare Whitmore v. Ar
kansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1726-29 (1990) (death row inmate lacked standing as "next friend"
to challenge validity of fellow inmate's death sentence as no evidence existed that latter was
unable to proceed on own behalf) and Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1012-13 (1976)
(mother denied standing to seek stay of execution on son's behalf because son made a
"knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights he might have asserted") with
Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1979) (public defender
granted stay of execution on behalf of condemned man because latter's waiver of legal
rights not "a rational decision").
207. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (litigants have standing
because "[t]heir interest is clear and immediate, within the rule ... where injunctions have
issued to protect business enterprises against interference with the freedom of patrons or
customers. ").
208. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,' 117 (1976) ("The closeness of the relationship
is patent .... Moreover, the constitutionally protected abortion decision is one in which
the physician is intimately involved."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)
("The rights of husband and wife ... are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless
those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential
relation to them. ").
209. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
210. Considerable overlap exists among the exceptions to the general rule against
third party standing. Thus, permitting the litigant to have third party standing in a case
such as Eisenstadt can be justified under the overbreadth exception ("[T]he Court fully
recognized [Baird's] standing to defend the privacy interests of third parties."). Craig, 429
U.S. at 196 (construing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972». It is also maintainable
where a party is unable to assert its own rights ("[U)nmarried persons denied access to
contraceptives ... are not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that extent, are denied
a forum in which to assert their own rights."). Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446
(1972). Finally, the litigant's third party standing in Eisenstadt comes within the scope of
the close relationship exception ("[D]octor-patient and accessory-principal relationships
are not the only circumstances in which one person has been found to have standing to
assert the rights of another.... And so here the relationship between Baird and those
whose rights he seeks to assert is not simply that between a distributor and potential dis
tributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons to obtain contraceptives and
those desirous of doing so."). Id. at 445.
211. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
212. Id.
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solely as a representative of its members. 213 According to Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,214 three factors must
occur for an organization to have representative standing: (a) an or
ganization's members must otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right, (b) the interests the organization seeks to protect must be
germane to its purpose, and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested must require individual member participation in the litiga
tion.21s The association still must satisfy the article III constitutional
requirements,216 yet it need not allege an injury to itself,217 only that
"its members, or anyone of them, are suffering immediate or
threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that
would make out a jllsticiable case had the members themselves
brought suit."218
This doctrine of associational standing is advantageous to both
individual members of an association and the judicial system for a
number of reasons. 219 An association suing on behalf of its members
can draw upon a "pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital" un
available or unaffordable to its individual members. 220 The Supreme
Court has noted that "[b]esides financial resources, organizations often
have specialized expertise and research resources relating to the sub
ject matter of the lawsuit that individual plaintiffs lack."221
Additionally, an association's focus on the particular issue being
litigated may promote superior litigation and judicial decision-mak
ing. 222 Because of this focus, the association may be a better advocate
of the interests at stake than its individual members. 223
213.

(1963).
214.

Id.; e.g., National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 372 U.S. 246

432 U.S. 333 (1977).
Id. at 343.
Warth, 422 U.S. at 511; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Warth, 422 U.S. at 511.
Id.; see also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,40 (1976).
219. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986).
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Note, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representatives Litigat
ing Their Members' Claims, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 663, 669).
222. But see supro notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
223. Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) ("[W]hen exerted on behalf of its directly affected members, [the association's inter
est] assure[s] [that] 'that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult ... questions' [exists]."
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962»), aff'd, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974).
"An individual class plaintiff's representation of the class can always be distorted by
individual circumstances which affect his zeal in prosecuting the suit, his perception of the
common problem, or his resources." Note, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representa
215.
216.
217.
218.
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People join associations to advance their interests. 224 "The only
practical judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests,
or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective
interests, often is to permit the association or corporation in a single
case to vindicate the interests of all."225 The particular purpose for
which individuals unite in an association may be furthered, in terms of
both public relations and the lessened potential for conflicting deci
sions in different jurisdictions,226 by allowing associational representa
tion of individual members. 227 A voiding repetitious litigation by
"resolv[ing] the claims of many individuals simultaneously"228 fosters
judicial economy in an economic sense. 229
Although allowing an association to assert third party standing
on behalf of its members has practical effects, there can be detrimental
aspects to associational standing as well. An association may inade
quately represent its members' interests230 by diverging completely
from them. 231 An association may encompass such a heterogeneous
tives Litigating Their Members' Claims, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 663, 669 [hereinafter Note, From
Net to Sword); see also Zacharias, Standing 0/ Public Interest Litigating Groups to Sue on
Behalf 0/ Their Members, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 453, 484-85 (1978).
224. E. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 163, § 2.3.7, at 90; see also NAACP v. Alabama
ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958) (An association "is but the medium through
which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own
views. . . . Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view . . . is undeniably
enhanced by group association ....").
225. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring».
226. Associational representation "enables the courts to make a judgment based on a
more complete appraisal of the interests involved, and reduces the likelihood of multiple
conflicting decrees." Note, From Net to Sword, supra note 223, at 668.
227. Id. at 668-70; see also Zacharias, supra note 223, at 479.
228. Note, From Net to Sword, supra note 223, at 668.
229. See id.; see also Heineman & Phillips, When Groups Represent Members in
Court . .. Assault on Associational Standing is Misguided, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 24, 1986, at 4,
col. 1 ("[I]f individual members' suits are brought neither as class actions nor as national
suits, then the courts will face many more suits .... [N]o one benefits ...."). But cf
Zacharias, supra note 223, at 482-83 (Loosening standing requirements will merely result in
additional organizational litigation.).
230. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986); see also Note, Associational Standing,
supra note 179.
231. Attorneys Heineman and Phillips feel this is not a significant problem. "Mem
bers'of [an association] ... have effective recourse if the organization fails to represent their
interests adequately.... Members can, for example, withdraw from the organization, vote
to adopt formal changes in its policy, or unite in order to oust from leadership those who
decided to pursue particular litigation." Heineman & Phillips, supra note 229; see
Zacharias, supra note 223, at 487-90 ("A [public interest litigating group)'s litigation is the
result of a democratic and well-informed decision to act by its members. . . . [E]ven if a
dissenting member does not wish a [public interest litigating group] to sue on his behalf in a
particular case, no harm will accrue to him by the organization's activities."); cf Note,
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membership that it will be ineffective in reflecting the views of particu
lar members or subgroups within the association. 232 The purposes of
an association's members and those purposes to which its leaders
strive may deviate regarding the particular issue being litigated,233 in
terms of litigation strategy234 or relief sought. 235 An association may
lack resources or experience,236 or may litigate without membership
authorization. 237 Finally, members may be estopped from relitigating
a lawsuit in which their association unsatisfactorily represented them
because of the principles of stare decisis, claim or issue preclusion. 238
In denying Polaroid standing to assert a claim on behalf of its
ESOP, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted several considera
tions that weighed against granting a corporation associational
standing. 239
From Net to Sword, supra note 223, at 669 (pressures on the organization include "the
threat to ... [itsJ survival from inadequate or unsuccessful representation.").
232. Note, Associational Standing, supra note 179, at 179-81 & nn.34-40; Note, From
Net to Sword, supra note 223, at 671; cf UAW, 477 U.S. at 289 (association might "reflect
the views of only. a bare majority-or even an influential minority-of the full member
ship" in other than litigation strategy).
233. See infra note 237.
234. UAW, 477 U.S. at 289; see also Note, Associational Standing, supra note 179, at
179-80 & n.34.
235. Note, Associational Standing, supra note 179, at 180 & n.36.
236. UAW, 477 U.S. at 289.
237. Id.; Note, From Net to Sword, supra note 223, at 670-71 (Without adequate
procedural safeguards, organizations "may not have the requisite structural development to
insure membership control or leadership accountability.... The organization may also
exceed the authority given to it by the members. ").
Attorneys Heineman and Phillips, however, have stated that this situation is no reason
for a court to deny associational standing:
[Because members canJ unite in order to oust from leadership those who decided
to pursue particular litigation ... courts should interfere with
association's
decision [to litigateJ only when it is beyond doubt that the litigation is ultra vires
of the association's basic charter. Conflicts within the organization concerning
matters relevant to its purposes are better handled by the membership than by a
federal court.
Heineman & Phillips, supra note 229.
238. Note, Associational Standing, supra note 179, at 185-87; Note, From Net to
Sword, supro note 223, at 670-71; see also supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text; cf
Zacharias, supra note 223, at 486-87 (benefits of allowing public interest litigating groups
standing to sue on members' behalf outweighs potential costs of binding members). But see
UAW, 477 U.S. at 290 (If an association does not adequately represent all injured members,
"a judgment won against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the association's
members without offending due process principles."); Note, From Net to Sword, supra note
223, at 673 ("The organization representational action will not eliminate all potential plain
tiffs unless they belong to the organization. ").
239. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 998-1001 (3d Cir. 1988).

an

94

III.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REYlEW

[Vol. 13:63

THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ApPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

As a defensive tactic against a potential takeover,240 Polaroid
sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Shamrock's tender offer, as
serting that Shamrock had violated the All-Holders Rule by excluding
the Polaroid ESOP shares from the offer.241 Shamrock questioned
whether Polaroid had standing to assert a breach of the Rule. 242 Prior
to the Polaroid takeover attempt, the question of whether a target cor
poration has standing, on behalf of its shareholders, to maintain a vio
lation of the All-Holders Rule by a potential acquiror, had never been
addressed. 243 The district court, noting the absence of controlling law,
assumed that Polaroid did have standing "[b]ecause target companies
are generally allowed to assert disclosure claims on behalf of share
holders."244 However, the issue of standing became the critical factor
in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling. 24s The court held that
Polaroid did not have third party standing to assert a violation of the
All-Holders Rule by Shamrock. 246
The court of appeals first examined the constitutional prerequi
sites for standing. 247 It held that Polaroid easily met these require
ments, stating "it is evident that Polaroid can reasonably determine
that it will be injured by the successful conclusion of Shamrock's
tender offer."248
The court next scrutinized whether Polaroid had third party
standing as an association. 249 While it found that some beneficial ef
fects would result if Polaroid were granted standing on behalf of its
240. For examples of other Polaroid defensive tactics, see supra note 46.
241. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990.
242. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 698. F. Supp. 1169, 1174 (D. Del.), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
243. "No reported decision ... has discussed the question ...." Polaroid, 862 F.2d
at 997.
244. Polaroid, 698 F. Supp. at 1174.
245. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 990.
246. [d. at 1001-02.
247. [d. at 997.
248. [d.
249. [d. at 998. The court also examined whether Polaroid had third party standing
under the close relationship exception to standing to sue doctrine. See id. at 1000 n.8; see
also supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text (regarding the close relationship exception).
The court noted that lawsuits in which a close relationship allows for third party standing
"all involve a litigation in which the merits of the suit involve the legitimacy of a restriction
on the relationship" between the litigant and the third party. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at
1000 n.8. As the All-Holders Rule violation occasioned no interference with the ability of
Polaroid or its shareholders to mutually interact, the close relationship exception did not
apply. See id.
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shareholders,250 it denied associational standing to the corporation on
a number of grounds.251 First, citing the second criterion for associa
tional standing formulated in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver
tising Commission,252 the court stated that it was "doubtful whether
'the interests' that Polaroid 'seeks to protect' in its litigation under the
All Holders Rule 'are germane to the organization's purpose.' "253
The court noted that litigation by an organization formed by share
holders to run a business "does not normally include protecting share
holders in their relationships with third parties."254 Rather, "a
corporation's ordinary litigation ... seeks to protect the corporation's
business."255
The court's second reason for denying Polaroid associational
standing was based on conflicts of interest inherent in All-Holders
Rule lawsuits. 256 The court found that such conflicts may make a cor
poration a poor representative of its shareholders' interests. 257 Two
potential conflicts exist. 258 Conflicts of interest among shareholder
groups as to the adversity or advantages of the tender offer make the
target corporation an uncertain representative for minority share
holder groupS.259 This conflict would "undermine[ ] the basis for jus
tertii standing-that the jus tertii advocate will vigorously assert the
interests of the right-holder."260
The other conflict of interest inherent in cases where corporations
seek third party associational standing is that management in a target
corporation may suffer because of a successful takeover, and thus,
have a built-in incentive to resist a tender offer that may be beneficial
to shareholders. 26i Shareholders may welcome a tender offer. 262 The
250. The court found that a target corporation usually will be able to finance litiga
tion beyond the means of individual shareholders, and that "this will have the salutary
effect of enforcing the securities laws." Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 998.
251. Id.
252. 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
253. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 999-1000. The court noted that "[u]nless protected by 'golden
parachutes' guaranteeing them a lucrative exit from corporate affairs, the corporation's top
officers may suffer a substantial loss in future earnings if the tender offer is successful." Id.
at 1000. In the "Plans for the Company" section of its Proxy Statement, Shamrock indi
cated it intended to seek "maximum representation on ... [Polaroid's] Board of Direc
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court stated that even the excluded security holders could profit from
such an offer by selling their stock to third parties after the offer is
announced, since stock market price "jumps skyward within minutes
after a credible tender offer is made."263 The court also concluded
that, at the very least, excluded security holders who do not sell their
securities still have their original shares and are no worse off than if no
tender offer had been made. 264 Management-instituted takeover de
fenses "raise 'the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting pri
marily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders.' "265
A third reason the court gave for denying associational standing
to a target corporation under the All-Holders Rule2 66 was in response
to Polaroid's argument that" '[t]he public interest is ... clearly in
favor of the enforcement of the securities laws.' "267 The court stated
that Polaroid's assertion failed to consider whether any relief granted
would be in excess of that contemplated by Congress or desirable in
terms of public policy; what effect any enforcement would have on
Congress' intent to entrust regulatory decisions to the Securities and
Exchange Commission; or whether the social benefits of enforcement
would outweigh the costS.268 What constitutes good tender offer pol
icy, the court noted, is beyond the scope of a SUbjective
interpretation. 269
Finally, the court responded to the idea that no reason exists for
distinguishing between All-Holders Rule standing and misrepresenta
tion standing. 270 It emphasized that allowing corporate third party
standing for misrepresentation claims brought under section 14(e) of
the Williams Act 271 makes sense because "[t]he bar against misrepre
tors." SHAMROCK ACQUISITION III, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 35 (Sept. 9, 1988).
Shamrock indicated that subject to a detailed review, it might consider changes in, inter
alia, Polaroid's management. Id.
262. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999.
263. Id.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 1000 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985».
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 37).
268. Id. at 1()()()"()1.
269. Id. at 1001.
270. Id.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988). Section 14(e) of the Williams Act regulates fraudu
lent misrepresentations or omissions. Id. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note
91, at 11, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2811,2821; SEN. REP. No.
550, supra note 91, at 10-11.
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sentation is meant to protect all shareholders. "272 Under a section
14(e) claim, the corporation would be representing all of its sharehold
ers. 273 However, the All-Holders Rule generally protects only a mi
nority of shareholders;274 in an action under the Rule, the corporation
would not be representing all shareholders, unlike an action under sec
tion 14(e).27s The court of appeals noted that litigation instituted by a
corporate litigant is more appropriate where the rights of all share
holders are being vindicated. 276 Furthermore, the court stated that
fraud may be more difficult to detect and may cause greater harm than
would violations ofthe All-Holders Rule. 277 Thus, greater need might
exist for target corporation standing in a fraud action. 278 In conclu
sion, the court noted that its prior adoption of the rule specifying that
target corporations have standing to sue for fraud had occurred with
out discussion, and that that rule should not be definitive as to target
corporation standing outside of the fraud context. 279
Judge Cowen concurred in part and dissented in part. 280 He
agreed with the holding that Shamrock violated Williams Act section
14(e), entitling Polaroid to preliminary injunctive relief because of
Shamrock's misrepresentations. 281 However, Judge Cowen dissented
from the court's holding that a target company lacks standing to assert
ajus tertii violation of the All-Holders Rule on behalf of its sharehold
ers.282 He stated that Shamrock's offer violated both the letter and
spirit of the Rule. 283
Judge Cowen argued that Polaroid, as a target company, does
have standing to assert a violation of the All-Holders Rule. 284 He
maintained that "the All-Holders Rule was promulgated by the SEC
to enforce and further the purposes of section 14(e) of the Williams
272. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1001. In addition to the All-Holders Rule claim, Polaroid
asserted that Shamrock violated section 14(e) of the Williams Act by failing to disclose
whether the offer complied with Federal Reserve Board margin requirements. Id. at 1003;
see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
273. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1001.
274. Id.
275. See id. The court stated that "[s]hareholder litigation under the aegis of the
corporation makes greater sense ... where the class of persons whose rights the corpora
tion is vindicating constitutes all of its shareholders." Id.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1007 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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Act, which proscribes 'fraudulent or manipulative acts ... in connec
tion with any tender offer.' "285 He concluded that to hold that a tar
get corporation has standing to assert a violation of Williams Act
section 14(e), the anti-fraud provision, but does not have standing to
assert a violation of the All-Holders Rule, promulgated to enforce sec
tion 14(e), departs from precedent and "undermines the goal of con
tinuity and consistency in the law."286
IV.

ANALYSIS

The issue of target corporation standing to sue under the Wil
liams Act has been a controversia1287 and ambiguous one. 288 While
the Supreme Court has never confronted the question of whether a
target corporation has third party standing on behalf of its sharehold
ers,289 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the costs of al
285. Id. at 1007-08 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e».
286. Id. at 1008.
287. Comment, Private Litigation Under the Williams Act: Standing to Sue, Ele
ments of a Claim and Remedies, 7 J. CoRP. L. 545, 559 (1982) [hereinafter Comment,
Private Litigation]; see, e.g., Pitt, supra note 48, at 186-87 (arguing against third party
standing, but for standing under a pnvate right of action for a target corporation); Tyson,
The Williams Act After Hanson Trust v. SCM Corporation: Post-Tender Offer Purchases
by the Tender Offeror, 61 TuL. L. REv. I, 36 (1986) (stating that the Williams Act's pur
pose of neutrality indicates that in an ideal situation, both target corporation and potential
acquiror should have standing); Comment, An Implied Private Right, supra note 48, at 318
(recommending that courts not imply a private right of action under the Williams Act for
target managements confronted with a tender offer).
288. Tyson & August, The Williams Act After RICO: Has the Balance Tipped in
Favor of Incumbent Management?, 35 HAsTINGS L.J. 53, 54, 64, 68, 70-71 & n.93 (1983).
A target corporation's standing to sue for damages or injunctive relief under the Wil
liams Act was "virtually unquestioned" prior to the United States Supreme Court's deci
sion in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein,
Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations of the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 1755, 1762
(1977); see also Tyson & August, supra, at 64 (Lower federal courts uniformly granted
standing to target corporations, consistently recognizing congressional concern "with pro
tecting investors and ensuring evenhanded regulation of contests for corporate control. ").
As an example, Aranow, Einhorn and Berlstein cite the Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
holding in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969), the first case to address the issue of standing under the Williams Act. Aranow,
Einhorn & Berlstein, supra, at 1762; Comment, An Implied Private Right, supra note 48, at
335. The court held that target companies had standing to seek injunctive relief under
sections 14(d) and (e) of the Williams Act. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Con
trols Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
289. Polaroid argued that Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975),
supported its position that target corporations have standing to assert Williams Act viola
tions against a potential acquiror. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 997 n.6 (3d Cir.
1988). However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Rondeau never reached
the private right of action or standing issues, but merely limited its focus to "the question of
an appropriate remedy." Id. The court noted that "[e]ven if Rondeau stood for the propo
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lowing standing clearly outweigh the benefits. 290 Because a focal point
of the Williams Act and the ensuing All-Holders Rule is investor pro
tection,291 the court concluded that some or all investors' interests
might receive short shrift if third party standing were allowed. 292
Since shareholder groups may have differing or even opposing inter
ests, some groups might be adversely affected by allowing Polaroid, or
in reality, its management,293 third party standing. The end result
would be that some investors, in this case those favorable to the Sham
rock bid, would stand unprotected. 294
Despite this conclusion, the court's assumptions regarding why
third party standing would be inappropriate for a target corporation
sition that a target corporation has standing to raise a claim under § 13(d) [of the Williams
Act], such a proposition would not necessarily establish that it has standing to raise a claim
under the All Holders Rule." Id.
For an opposing view of the Rondeau decision, see Ferrara & Robinson, The Develop
ment of Express and Implied Remedies Under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, in INTRODUCTION TO LmGATION OF DISPUTES AFFECTING THE
U.S. AND THE U.K. 409, 486 (practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 409, 1987) (The Supreme Court arguably assumed that pri
vate litigants have standing to sue.); Comment, Private Litigation, supra note 287, at 560
n.118 (The Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the target corporation had a
private right of action.).
290. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 997-1002 (3d Cir. 1988).
In Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the benefits of allowing standing outweighed the costs. See 409
F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969). Specifically, the court recognized that a target corporation's
superior resources, as opposed to those of its individual shareholders, were vital to mount
ing a swift, forceful attack against an illegal offer. Id. The target corporation might also be
harmed by a loss of business or financing because of misrepresentations or omissions by a
potential acquiror. Id. While the cost of allowing standing is that a target corporation's
management might resist an offer "motivated by its own interests and contrary to the best
interests of the true owners, the shareholders," the court found that the shareholders' reme
dies for waste against the management would counter this cost. Id.; see also Polaroid, 862
F.2d at 999-1000 (noting the same conflict of interest).
Discussing the cases before the Supreme Court's decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft In
dus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), Tyson and August have stated:
With respect to suits by target companies, standing was seen as consonant
with investor protection. Damages would benefit the shareholder-investor and
would serve to deter violations [of the Williams Act], and equitable relief would,
for example, remedy misleading disclosures so that investors could make in
formed investment decisions....
. . . It was perceived that the target of a takeover attempt is best suited to
monitor the process.
Tyson & August, supra note 288, at 65 & n.67.
291. See supra notes 104-09, 147-50 and accompanying text.
292. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 998-1002.
293. See id at 999-1000 ("[T]hose in control of the target corporation have a natural
incentive to resist a corporate takeover.").
294. See id.
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were flawed in some respects. Granting third party standing to a liti
gant encompasses both beneficial and detrimental attributes. A deter
mination of whether a target corporation should have standing on
behalf of its shareholders requires an examination of both sides of the
equation.
A.

Associational Standing Under the Hunt 295 Test: The
Organization's Purpose

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals may have erred in its appli
cation of the second factor established in Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission,296 namely in concluding that protect
ing shareholders in their relationships with third parties is not ger
mane to a corporation's purpose. 297 In fact, representing share
holders, the owners of the corporation, in their relationships· with
third parties, from creditors and suppliers to the consuming public
and the corporation's community, is vital to the functions of the or
ganization, and occurs on a daily basis. 298
The court stated it was "doubtful whether 'the interests' that Po
laroid 'seeks to protect' in its litigation under the All Holders Rule
295.

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
296. Id. The second factor of the associational standing doctrine formulated in Hunt
requires that the interests the organization seeks to protect must be germane to its purpose.
See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
297. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999; supra notes 252-55. The court stated that trade
associations, public interest groups and other associations have been granted third party
standing to challenge federal agency rules and if Polaroid, as a corporation, fit within the
contours of associational standing doctrine, it too might have third party standing under
the All-Holders Rule. Id. at 998.
298. Legally, shareholders elect directors who hire officers to operate the corpora
tion. R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS §§ 13.6.3, 14.4.2 (1989).
Corporations have a wide spectrum of relationships with groups such as governments, sup
pliers, creditors, customers, etc. R. CLARK, CoRPORATE LAW § 1.4 (1986); T. WHEELEN
& J. HUNGER, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT § 1.4, at 10-12 (2d ed. 1987); see, e.g., Baird, A
World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 182 (1987) (Managers rep
resent the corporation's shareholders when filing a bankruptcy petition.). While the corpo
ration may be viewed as a separate legal entity, it is "simply another mode by which
individuals or natural persons can enjoy their property and engage in business." R. HAMIL
TON, CORPORATIONS 4 (3d ed. 1986) (quoting W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CoNCEPTIONS 197 (1923».
For an opposing view, see Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 917 (1982)
("In contrast to the traditional approach, which views shareholders as the 'owners' of the
firm, modem theory emphasizes that the private corporation, like other forms of organiza
tion, is simply a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for a set of contractual relationships
among individuals." (footnote omitted».
For a discussion of other theories of corporate personality, see generally H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 78 (3d ed. 1983).
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'are germane to the organization's purpose.' "299 The court defined
these interests as "the right of some of its shareholders to sell at a price
equal to that of other of its shareholders to a third party, the tender
offeror."300 The court distinguished these shareholder interests from
those "pursued in a corporation's ordinary litigation, which seeks to
protect the corporation's business."301 However, the court's distinc
tion may be arbitrary: in both cases, a corporation may be seeking to
protect the corporation's business. Were a takeover to occur, Polar
oid's long-term business strategy might be adversely affected by the
layoffs,302 asset sales,303 and lessened research and development ex
penditures304 that have historically occurred after corporate acquisi
299. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977».
300. Id. at 998.
301. Id. at 998-99.
302. See R. BELL, SURVIVING THE 10 ORDEALS OF THE TAKEOVER 1 (1988)
("[m]ass firings of managers due to takeovers"); Helyar, RJR Employees Fight Distraction
Amid Buy-Out Talks, Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at A8, col. 1 ("[M]any . . . number
crunchers, planners and support personnel ... get axed after a leveraged buy-out."); Wall
St. J., Aug. 2, 1988, at 1, col. 5 (''Takeovers ... spur managers even more to plan work
force cuts and to resist worker demands for pay-and-benefit gains, often because debt may
balloon in the acquisition."). Contra Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. Bus.
REv., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 109, 114 ("No evidence ... indicates that takeovers produce
more plant closings, layoffs, and dismissals than would otherwise have occurred. "); Zucker
man, Letter ofJanuary 15. 1988 From Jeffrey L Zuckerman, Director. Federal Trade Com
mission, to the Honorable Steven H. Amick, in THE NEW DELAWARE TAKEOVER
STATUTE 241, 245, 248-49 (practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 598, 1988).
303. Drucker, Taming the Corporate Takeover, Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1984, at 30, col.
3. Professor Drucker stated "the successful raider immediately strips his new acquisition of
its best assets and drains it of cash-both to repay what he borrowed to buy the business
and to make a quick killing." Id. Assets must be sold because the interest rates many
acquired companies pay on their debt are more than twice their nominal sales growth rate.
Liscio, The Buyout Bubble: When It Bursts, There'll Be Fallout Aplenty, BARRON'S, Oct.
31, 1988, at 6, col. 1, 32, col. 1.
Atty. Martin Lipton cites Pantry Pride's acquisition of Revlon as "[a] classic example
of the junk-bond, bust-up takeover." Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11 n.40 (1987). Pantry Pride sold nearly $1.4 billion of
Revlon's assets to finance its acquisition. Id.
304. E.g., Restructurings, Buy-Outs Cut R&D. Survey Shows, Wall St. J., Feb. 3,
1989, at A6, col. 4; Anders, supra note 2. Contra Hall, The Effect of Takeover Activity on
Corporate Research and Development, in CoRPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CoNSE
QUENCES 69, 93 (1988) (concluding that acquisitions do not result in decreased research
and development spending); Boulanger, Corporate America Isn't a Debt Debauchee, Wall
St. J., Nov. 22, 1988, at A20, col. 3 (arguing that leveraged acquisitions allow corporations
to "make the capital investments and research-and-development expenditures necessary to
maintain the corporation's long-term competitiveness and increase its value" because they
free the company from "the myopic discipline of the public markets.").
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tions.30!! A corporation such as Polaroid, with its equity securities
undervalued in the short-term either as a result of market ftuctua
tions 306 or long-term strategy considerations,307 might be disman
305. Putka, Stop & Shop Strike Linked to Buy-Out Closes 50 Stores, Wall St. J., Mar.
23, 1988, at 16, col. 3 ("Buy-outs often involve layoffs and asset sales to raise cash flow and
payoff the heavy borrowings needed for the takeover."); see also Anders & Smith, Wobbly
LBOs: Leveraged Buy-Outs That Appear Shaky Are on the Increase, Wall St. J., Dec. 5,
1988, at AI, col. 6 ("Success in these deals requires ... cost-cutting, asset sales and rapid
repayment of debt."); Queenan, The ABCs ofLBOs: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know,
BARRON'S, Sept. 5, 1988, at 58, col. 1 (To reduce debt to more manageable proportions,
new owners "sell off assets, streamline operations, or get rid of employees. ").
Harold M. Williams, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
and Professor Peter Drucker both have stated that even fear of a takeover adversely affects
long-term business strategy. See Williams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FOR
TUNE, July 22, 1985, at 133, 136; Drucker, supra note 303.
306. Shiller, Fashions, Fads. and Bubbles in Financial Markets, in KNIGHTS, RAID
ERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra note 2, at 56 (argu
ing that the notion of short-term market efficiency is incorrect); see also B. GRAHAM, D.
DODD & S. CoTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 694-96 (4th ed.
1962) (stating that stocks may be overvalued or undervalued depending in part on the state
of the business cycle); Shubik, Corporate Control. Efficient Markets, and the Public Good, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra
note 2, at 31; Swartz & Smith, Market Movers: Program Traders Sway Prices of Many
Stocks Even More Than Ever, Wall St. J., May 2, 1988, at 1, col. 6 (noting that program
trading results in "large, extremely quick intraday [stock market) swings that may have
little to do with the economy or market fundamentals.").
For a description of the efficient market hypothesis, see E. BRIGHAM & L. GAPENSKI,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 249-51 (6th ed. 1991); R. HIGGINS,
ANALYSIS FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 157-62 (2d ed. 1989). See also Schools Brief:
Risk and Return, THE EcONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1991, at 72 (discussing the efficient market
hypothesis' "most famous offspring," the capital-asset pricing model, and newer financial
theories).
307. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Nos. 10,866, 10,670, & 10,935, at 19
(Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) (WESTLAW, DE-CS directory) (noting that immediate market
valuation might undervalue a stock despite the theory of an efficient capital market that
does not discount for long-term profit maximizing behavior except to reflect the time value
of money); see also Introduction to KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF
THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra note 2, at 3-4 (At a November, 1985 symposium, three
chief executive officers stated that "prices in the stock market frequently fail to reflect a
firm's long-term prospects."). But cf Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the Na
tional Economy, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 467, 482 (Vaguely stated goals, such as the long-term
interests of a corporation, should not permit a firm's managers to ignore current share price
value.).
Atty. Martin Lipton's study indicated that the target corporation's stockholders gener
ally benefitted after a hostile takeover was defeated. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 106-09, 132-33 (1979) [hereinafter Lipton, Takeover Bids).
Specifically, a majority of target corporations that resisted hostile takeovers either later
traded at higher stock market prices than the potential acquiror offered, or were acquired
by another company at a higher price after the tender offer was defeated. See id. at 106;
Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28
J.L. & EcON. 151, 152-53 (1985) (Defensive litigation by the target company very fre
quently resulted in "rivalrous bidding involving many potential suitors" or "improved bids
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tled 308 or effectively emasculated309 after a takeover. 310 Alternately, it
by the original suitors."); cf Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 254
(7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he first tender offer may not be the best. ... You may want to see
whether you can sell it for even more ...."), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). But see Jarrell,
supra, at 174 ("The targets that defeat the takeover attempt by vigorous litigation lose the
entire takeover premium."); Jensen, supra note 302, at 116 (Target companies that receive
no other bid lose the entire takeover-generated stock price increase.); Jensen & Ruback,
The Market For Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 5, 14-16
(1983) (Two years after the announcement of a takeover attempt, targets of unsuccessful
tender offers that do not receive subsequent offers trade at prices slightly lower than the
pre-announcement price.). An updated study confirmed this, noting that 81 % of target
corporations later sold at prices higher than the potential acquiror offered. Lipton &
Brownstein, Takeover Responsibilities and Directors' Responsibilities: An Update, in A.B.A.
NAT'L INST. ON THE DYNAMICS OF CoRP. CoNTROL 10 (1983). Accounting for the time
value of money, the 81% figure lowered to 64%. Id. For a contrary view, see Easterbrook
& Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW.
1733, 1739-45 (1981).
Polaroid's stock market prices immediately after Shamrock's unsuccessful takeover
bid support Atty. Lipton's conclusions. Less than seven months after Shamrock and Polar
oid settled, Polaroid traded at prices almost 20% higher than Shamrock had offered. See
Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1989, at C5, col. 1 (polaroid traded at 50 3/8.). However, this may
have resulted from restructuring forced on Polaroid in order to avoid Shamrock's over
tures. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., No. 10,582 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989)
(WESTLAW, DE-CS directory) (noting a self-tender offer); supra note 46; see also POLAR
OID CoRP., PROXY STATEMENT (Feb. 21, 1989) (offer to purchase up to 16 million shares
at S50/share). See generally Ingrassia, Polaroid Falls 22% on Negative News, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 16, 1990, at Cl, col. 3 (Noting that Polaroid received less than expected in its patent
infringement suit against Eastman Kodak Co. and had closed at 22 3/4 the previous day,
one commentator wrote: "[g]one are the giddy days of last year, when Polaroid was fend
ing off a S45-a-share hostile bid . . . . The stock now is barely above half the level of the
takeover bid.").
308. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1,2-3 (1986) (Recent acquirors of corporations "intend[] not to assimilate
the target [corporation], but to dismantle it."). The target corporation is dismantled be
cause its liquidation value is greater than its going-concern value. Id. at 3 n.4. One reason
target corporations are dismantled is that "offerors . . . are compelled by the pressures of
the financing of the takeover to effect a total or partial liquidation [of the acquired com
pany]." Note, A Policy Analysis of New York State's Security Takeover Disclosure Act, 53
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1117, 1136-37 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A Policy Analysis] (quoting a
New York State Executive Department memorandum which noted adverse effects caused
by highly leveraged takeovers). Companies that have been completely or partially disman
tled subsequent to a takeover include Beatrice and Safeway. Johnson & Burrough, Bea
trice's Kelly Is Said to Plan Spinoff of Unit, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1988, at 2, col. 2; Bulkeley,
Stop & Shop, Kohlberg Reach Buy-Out Pact, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
309. For a view that corporate raiders diminish wealth even when target corpora
tions elude them, see Lipton, supra note 303, at 23-25; Anders & Schwadel, supra note 4;
Sandler, Generating Wealth: Do Savvy Managers Do Better by Investors Than Raiders
Can?, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
310. Although Shamrock stated that it had no present intention to make any signifi
cant sales of Polaroid's assets, it did intend to cause Polaroid to drop plans to enter the 35
mm film business, to sell at least a substantial portion of Polaroid's undeveloped real estate,
to minimize excess manufacturing capacity, and to refocus Polaroid's research and devel
opment activities. SHAMROCK ACQUIsmON III, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 35 (Sept. 9,
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may become so highly leveraged that it becomes ineffective as a busi
ness entity, concentrating not on developing its business, but paying
off the massive debt incurred as a result of the takeover.3l1 Polaroid,
1988). Shamrock also announced it was considering changes in Polaroid's "business, corpo
rate structure, Certificate [of incorporation], By-laws, capitalization or management." Id.
Shamrock did not rule out the possibility of sales of "certain other assets or businesses of
... [Polaroid]." Id.
While Shamrock left itself wide leeway regarding its future plans for Polaroid, "take
over artists aren't always viewed as being pure of heart." Lowenstein, Note-Holders, Perel
man Clash Over a Pledge, Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1990, at Cl, col. 3 (discussing a civil suit in
which it is alleged that corporate raider Ronald Perelman, after making obligations to
bondholders to effectuate his takeover of Revlon, reneged on those obligations).
311. Discussing Campeau Corp.'s petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Guy
Peyrelongue, chief executive of Cosmair, Inc., a large cosmetics supplier to Campeau
stores, stated " 'The department stores are good stores, with loyal customers. Their prob
lem is not the way they've been managed, but the unbearable levels of debt taken on by
Campeau.''' Campeau's Woes: Bankruptcy Petition Brings Fresh Risks for Allied, Feder
ated, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1990, at AI, col. 6, AlO, col. 3. The bankruptcy filings of
Campeau's U.S. retailing units "capped long periods of uncertainty in which store execu
tives had spent as much time worrying about their jobs as about their companies," resulting
in interrupted merchandise shipments, weakened customer confidence, questioned credit
worthiness, and tarnish to reputations that had taken decades to build. Trachtenberg,
Damaged Goods: Lessons for Campeau: It's Not Easy Being a Chapter 11 Retailer, Wall St.
J., Jan. 30, 1990, at AI, col. 6.
The New York State Executive Department believed that" '[a]fter a highly leveraged
takeover, a very high percentage of the revenues produced by the acquired assets are di
verted to pay the acquisition debt.''' Note, A Policy Analysis, supra note 308, at 1137
(quoting a memorandum which noted adverse effects caused by highly leveraged take
overs). Furthermore, the standard junk-bond prospectus states that unless asset sales or
debt refinancing occur in the future, "the bondholders may never see their money again."
. Grant, Corporate Finance, 'Leveraged to the Hilt': Will History Repeat Itself?, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 25, 1988, at A26, col. 3. The standard prospectus also states that the issuing company
must produce significantly greater future cash flow than it has historically, merely to avoid
bankruptcy. Id.; see also Liscio, supra note 303, at 6, col. 1,7, col. 1. Taken together, these
statements imply a focus on managing leverage rather than developing a corporation's busi
ness.
In leveraged buy-outs, where "investors rely almost entirely on debt financing to ac
quire a company," the risks that occur in traditional acquisitions "are magnified because of
the companies' heavy debt burdens." Anders & Smith, supra note 305 (discussing potential
bankruptcy candidates and companies that have filed for bankruptcy protection because
takeovers imposed too heavy a debt burden for them to manage). As one financial advisor
stated, " '[t]he numbers are tight; there isn't a lot of room for a slip-up.''' Id. Because the
balance sheet of an acquired leveraged corporation often resembles that of a bankrupt com
pany, it is rational for a corporate raider to focus on paying down debt. Cf Grant, supra
(discussing the high debt, low cash, low or negative net worth, and nonexistent interest
coverages common to both the Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the leveraged buyout).
Even corporate acquiror Theodore J. Forstmann has cautioned that "(t]oday's finan
cial age has become a period of unbridled excess with accepted risk soaring out of propor
tion to possible reward ... [because] with ever-increasing levels of irresponsibility, many
billions of dollars in American assets are being saddled with debt that has virtually no
chance of being repaid." Forstmann, Corporate Finance, 'Leveraged to the Hilt': Violating
Our Rules of Prudence, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at A26, col. 5. "[T]he corporate debt
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incorporated in Delaware, states in its certificate of incorporation that
it may "do all and everything necessary or incidental to the accom
plishment of any of the [business] purposes [set forth in the certifi
cate],"312 Polaroid also has "all the rights, powers and privileges ...
conferred by the laws of the State of Delaware upon business corpora
tions."313 Delaware courts have stated that a corporation's directors
have the latitude under the business judgment rule to reject a tender
offer they feel is not in the best interests of the corporation. 314 Logi
cally, it is germane to Polaroid's best interests to avoid a takeover if
the offer undervalues the corporation. 3lS By representing an impor
generated by takeovers and LBOs may be ballooning to dangerous levels." Salwen, Inves
tors Fret Over Possible LBO Curbs, Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1988, at Cl, col. 3. This debt
occurs "at the long-term expense of ... companies." Forstmann, supra. Contra Boulanger,
supra note 304 (Not only has the increased debt of corporate America not led to wide
spread problems, but "[o]ne of the principal benefits from taking a company private in a
LBO is the ability of management to concentrate on long-term growth."); but see Defusing
the Debt Bomb, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 3, 1990, at 75 ("[T]he record level of corporate
debt is less worrying than it seems.").
312. POLAROID CoRP., 1985 RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION § 3(m).
The business purposes set forth in Polaroid's certificate include a wide variety of objectives
consonant with operating a multinational, multibillion dollar business. See id. § 3(a-m).
313. Id. § 3(m); see also New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1, 10 n.4 (1988) (discussing whether an association's purpose as stated in its certificate of
incorporation meets the second requirement of Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertis
ing Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977».
314. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del.
1987). The business judgment rule "is a presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The Polaraid court itself stated that "those who manage the
corporation have a fiduciary duty to respond to takeovers in the best interests of the corpo
ration's shareholders." Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1000 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988).
315. Professor Kripke argues that "[p]leas of the defending management that the
stock is undervalued and the offer is insufficient fallon deaf stockholder ears." H. KRIPKE,
THE SEC AND CoRPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 267
(1979). He states that a person offered cash for his stock is primarily concerned with how
much money he can get, how he has to go about getting it, and when he can get it. See id.
(arguing that cash tender offer disclosure is useless). This supports the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals' notion that a conflict of interest exists between corporate management and its
shareholders, and corporate standing on behalf of the shareholders is properly denied as a
result of it. See Polaraid, 862 F.2d at 999.
Arguably, however, all stakeholders of a target corporation have parallel interests
where the effect of the sale of the corporation would be to render it insolvent, unable to
repay its debt, or lacking sufficient capital to conduct its business. See Dockser, Creditors
of Buy-Out Firms That Fail Sue Ex-Holders, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1988, at Bl, col. 5. In
such a case, anyone involved in the transfer is subject to fraudulent conveyance laws which
permit creditors to invalidate certain transactions. See Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against
Participants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REv. 449, 452, 472-96 (1988) (buying and
selling shareholders, and independent lenders, may be liable); Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 851, 852 n.51 (1985)
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tant constituent in its business, its employees, via an efficient mecha
nism, the employees' ESOP, Polaroid may be protecting its long-term
business interests by preventing the dismantling of its workforce - a
strategic asset - for less than adequate consideration. 316 By protect
ing its ESOP - and the employees represented by that ESOP - Po
laroid may be protecting its own business. 317 It may be effectuating
the greatest long-term value for all its shareholders by focusing on
long-term retums,3I8jnstead of sacrificing the corporation to a corpo
(managers and selling shareholders might be liable); see also Pollock, Filings of Campeau
Units May Spur Suits in Murky 'Fraudulent Conveyance' Area, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1990, at
A 10, col. 4. As "fraudulent conveyance is still evolving as a legal theory in leveraged buy
outs," it is a potential pitfall, despite that "shareholders of publicly traded companies ...
probably aren't at significant risk under ... [the] law." Dockser, supra, at Bl, col. 5, B6,
col. 3-4; see also Sherwin, supra, at 479-80 (Shareholder liability to creditors has rarely been
litigated where outside lenders finance buyouts.). Under this scenario, since the interests of
management and shareholders correspond, avoidance of a takeover financed largely by debt
promotes corporate third party standing.
For a further discussion of fraudulent conveyance law in leveraged buy-out situations,
see Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 845-47 (9th Cir. 1988); Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in
Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 73 (1985); Kirby, McGuinness & Kandel, Fraudulent Convey
ance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout Lending, 43 Bus. LAW. 27 (1987); Murdoch, Sartin &
Zadek, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Transfers: Life After Gleneagles, 43 Bus. LAW.
1 (1987); Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 CoLUM. L. REv.
1491 (1987).
316. Campeau Corp.'s efforts to continue paying employee severance benefits even
while in bankruptcy, in order to "reassure their thousands of staff and prevent them [from]
jumping ship," illustrate the importance of employees to a corporation's long-term business
interests. See Campeau Units Can Pay Benefits; Sale of Bloomingdale's Is Delayed, Inves
tor's Daily, Feb. 2, 1990, at 4, col. 2. Federated Department Stores, Inc. and Allied Stores
Corp. had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, unable to meet interest payments on the heavy
debt incurred when corporate raider Robert Campeau acquired them. Id.
317. In GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., the court found the interests of employees
and corporate managers who service investors' interests to be a legitimate concern of "[a]
corporation with a perceived threat of dismemberment." GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The Delaware Supreme Court stated
that directors confronted with a takeover may consider its "impact on 'constituencies'
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the com
munity generally)." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
318. The recovery of damages by target corporations from potential acquirors may
be of sufficiently direct benefit to the target's shareholders that the right to seek such dam
ages may be implied from the legislative intent in passing the Williams Act. Cf E. ARA
NOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CoNTROL 112 (1977). This indicates that granting third party standing to a
target corporation may offer short-term benefits in the form of damages to the target's
shareholders.
Other short-term benefits might also accrue by allowing the target corporation third
party standing. For example, it has been stated that hostile takeovers divert managerial
attention. Coffee, supra note 308, at 11. Allowing the target corporation third party stand
ing may increase the potential acquiror's risks and, consequently, lessen the potential for a
bid. Thus, management can concentrate on business operations rather than the potential
acquiror's threats to the company. Polaroid spent millions of dollars warding off Sham
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rate raider who stands to make a huge short-term gain. 319 Sharehold
ers in a widely traded corporation who object to a corporate decision
to focus on long-term prospects instead of short-term gains are, as the
court stated, "generally free to sell their stock on any terms that they
wish [on or off the stock exchanges] without interference from the
corporation. "320 A number of states have enacted antitakeover
rock's takeover attempts. See supra note 46. The rational shareholder would much rather
have had this money invested in the corporation than have it in the pockets of the lawyers
and investment bankers Polaroid used to defend itself or in Shamrock's pockets. Id. (re
garding terms of Polaroid's settlement with Shamrock); see also Cohen, Takeover Boom Is
Expected to Benefit Usual Small Circle 0/ Wealthy Law Firms, Wall St. I., Oct. 25, 1988, at
B8, col. 5. See generally Drucker, supra note 303 (unfriendly takeover may benefit no one
other than the corporate raider, investment bankers, and merger lawyers).
The same line of reasoning - supporting short-term benefit accrual by allowing a
target corporation standing on behalf of its shareholders - applies to the argument that
hostile takeovers divert employee attention as well. Employee attention will focus on oper
ations rather than on potential layoffs or unfamiliar employment or salary policies that
might result if a hostile takeover is consummated. Cf. E. ARANow. H. EINHORN & G.
BERlSfEIN, supra, at 198, 204 n.24 (discussing employee reluctance or disposition to
tender shares to a potential acquiror).
319. For example, Ronald Perelman, who used junk bonds to buy undervalued as
sets, dismantle acquired companies, and raid larger ones, had a net worth estimated at
$2.75 billion in 1989. The Forbes Four Hundred, supra note 10, at 154. Corporate raider
Henry Kravis increased his net worth by over $300 million in the 1980s. See Wall St. I.,
Ian. 26, 1990, at B8, col. 3. Billionaire Harold Simmons built his fortune via hostile take
overs. The Forbes Four Hundred, supra note 10, at 162. Undervalued, asset-rich compa
nies provided the foundation for corporate raider Victor Posner's estimated 1989 net worth
of $295 million. Id. at 284.
Corporate acquiror Theodore 1. Forstmann quoted the managing partner of a major
investment banking firm as stating that" 'all of us have been somewhat corrupted by the
potential for short-term gain.''' Forstmann, supra note 311 (discussing the precarious fi
nancial straits that resulted when investment banks began viewing buyouts and corporate
acquisitions as vehicles for high-margin agency business).
320. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 999 (3d Cir. 1988). But cf. Macey,
supra note 307, at 481 (Differentiating between shareholders interested in only short-term
or only long-term considerations is fatuous because all shareholders realize the same gain
from future events, as reflected in a firm's current share price.).
Controversy over investment time-frames did not begin with the recent spate of take
overs. In 1936, economist Iohn Maynard Keynes, discussing the dialectical extremes be
tween long and short-term investing, stated:
[I]t is the long-term investor ... who most promotes the public interest [but] ...
[t]here is no clear evidence from experience that the investment policy which is
socially advantageous coincides with that which is most profitable. . . . Invest
ment based on genuine long-term expectation is so difficult to-day as to be
scarcely practicable. He who attempts it must surely lead much more laborious
days and run greater risks than [the short-term investor] ... and, given equal
intelligence, he may make more disastrous mistakes.
1. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 157
(1936). Keynes noted that the long-term investor will be most criticized, "[f]or it is in the
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laws in furtherance of the objective of promoting long-term business
interests. 321 These state antitakeover laws are not incongruent
essence of his behaviour that he should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in
the eyes of average opinion." Id.
More recently, corporate raider T. Boone Pickens has discussed this polarity vis-a-vis
the management-shareholder relationship:
On a rational level, [long-term investment] ... theory attracts support be
cause it seems plausible to those not closely involved with takeover activity. On
an emotional level, the theory appears to embrace basic American values such as
patience, perseverance, and faith in future rewards.
. . . [M]anagers have learned to portray themselves as long-term visionaries
and their dissident stockholders as short-term opportunists.
. . . [I]t is questionable how much more long-term planning America's share
holders can stand. What many managements seem to be demanding is more time
to keep making the same mistakes.
Pickens, Professions of a Short-Termer, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1986, at 75, 76, 78.
321. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson SUpp.
1990); 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 94, 97 (purdon). For example, the Ohio statute states:
[A] director, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation, shall consider the interests of the corporation's shareholders
and, in his discretion, may consider ... [t]he long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and_its shareholders, including the possibility that
these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the
corporation.
OHIO REV. CoDE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson SUpp. 1990).
The Arizona statute states that "a director ... shall consider the long-term as well as
the short-term interests." ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis ad
ded).
States have also enacted legislation that allows directors, in considering the best inter
ests of the corporation, to take constituencies other than shareholders into account. See,
e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,1]8.85 (Smith-Hurd SUpp. 1990); IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-35
l(d) (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. l3-A, § 716 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West SUpp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1)(4) (Vernon SUpp.
1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson SUpp. 1990); 1990 Pa. Legis. Servo
94, 97 (purdon). These constituencies include employees, suppliers, customers, creditors,
communities, and others. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West SUpp. 1991).
See generally Coffee, The Uncertain Case For Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435 (arguing that it is a valid legislative goal
to protect these constituencies); Drucker, Corporate Takeovers-What Is to Be Done?, 82
PUB. INTEREST 3, 22-24 (1986) (contending that by law or otherwise, a way must be found
to protect these constituencies); Jensen, supra note 302, at 110-11 (maintaining that stock
holders, as bearers of the corporation's residual risk, should be the ultimate holders of the
rights to organizational control); Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are
They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1986) (offering three options for considering
these constituencies' interests during a takeover); Pickens, supra note 320, at 78 (stating
that shareholders' interests should take precedence over other constituencies because share
holders own the companies). Impliedly, these statutes allow directors to address long-term
as well as short-term concerns. See Stakes, Shares and Digestible Poison Pills, THE EcONO
MIST, Feb. 2, 1991, at 61 (stating that "a concern for stakeholders," which includes "em
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with the federal securities laws promoting investor protection. 322
Under these circumstances, representing shareholders in their rela
tionships with third parties - corporate raiders - is germane to a
target corporation's purpose. 323 In terms of granting third party
ployees, suppliers, customers and neighbours" is "associated with long-term investment").
See generally Lipton, Takeover Bids, supra note 307, at 109-12 (discussing the importance
of a long-term outlook). For a view that state antitakeover statutes should not permit or
encourage target corporation directors to consider non-shareholder interests, see Comment,
Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our Brothers' Keeper?, 1988
CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 301.
Missouri has enacted a statute authorizing corporate directors to consider "[t]he fu
ture value of the corporation over a period of years as an independent entity discounted to
current value" if an "acquisition proposal" is made. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1)(I)(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1991). Directors may consider political, economic or other factors bearing
on securities prices generally or the corporation's securities in particular. Id.
• corporation's current value in a freely negotiated
§ 351.347(1)(2). They may consider the
merger, consolidation, or asset sale; the corporation's current value if liquidated; whether
the acquisition proposal might violate any laws; and the competence, experience, integrity,
financial condition, and earning prospects of the person making the bid, including debt
servicing abilities. Id. § 351.347(1)(I)(a)-(b), (1)(3), (1)(5), (1)(6). The sum total of these
subsections enhances directorial control over the takeover process, giving a target corpora
tion's board greater leeway in exercising its fiduciary duties, and thus, making hostile take
overs more difficult. Garfield, State Competence to Regulate Corporate Takeovers: Lessons
From State Takeover Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 535, 567 (1989) ("[M)odified fiduciary
statutes simply give corporate managers additional discretion to be used in a takeover
fight."). The authorization to consider items such as a corporation's future value over a
period of years and a potential acquiror's debt servicing abilities indicates that directors
may account for long-term business interests. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(1)(I)(c),
(1)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that in the face of a takeover bid, corporate
directors "may reasonably consider the basic stockholder interests at stake, including those
of short term speculators, whose actions may have fueled the coercive aspect of the offer at
the expense of the long term investor." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955-56 (Del. 1985).
322. See CIS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (upholding
Indiana statute regulating takeovers against claim that it was preempted by federal securi
ties laws). The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Indiana statute furthered a basic purpose
of the Williams Act, that of " 'plac[ing] investors on an equal footing with the takeover
bidder,'''. Id. at 82 (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1,30 (1977) (quoting the
Senate Report accompanying the Williams Act, S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1967))). Arguably, the Indiana statute, which regulates shareholder voting rights, is differ
ent than the fiduciary statutes that expand directorial discretion. See Prentice, The Role 0/
States in Tender Offers: An Analysis 0/ ers, 1988 CoWM. Bus. L. REv. I (discussing
types of state antitakeover statutes); supra note 321. However, Professor Prentice stated
that the fiduciary statutes are likely to be held constitutional under the theory that they do
not deter the making or hinder the successful completion of tender offers. See Prentice,
supra, at 65-66, 69-70. He also stated that while fiduciary statutes run the risk of being
preempted because they frustrate the Williams Act's main goal of shareholder protection,
an argument could be made that "the states have every right to regulate their own corpora
tions and ... Congress did not mean to alter this situation through the Williams Act." Id.
at 71, 74-75. This latter argument was the thrust of the Court's opinion in CTS. Id. at 74.
323. To have associational standing to bring suit on behalf of its shareholders under
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standing to oppose a takeover, this second Hunt factor is not, as the
court of appeals stated, "too latent with difficulties to yield a definitive
answer."324
B. Associational Standing Under the Hunt 325 Test: The Conflicts of
Interests
The third Hunt associational standing factor is that "neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of in
dividual members in the lawsuit."326 Despite a potentially erroneous
application of the second Hunt factor, the Third Circuit Court of Ap
peals correctly denied Polaroid third party standing to enforce the All
Holders Rule because the conflicts of interest inherent in the situation
required individual member participation. 327 Dissenting Judge Cowen
implied that the court addressed the issue in the abstract,328 but in
the All-Holders Rule, Polaroid would have to fulfill the other two factors of the Hunt test.
See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); supra
text accompanying notes 214-15. The first factor requires Polaroid's shareholders to have
standing to sue in their own right. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Since the court of appeals found
that the All-Holders Rule created a private right of action for shareholders, this part of the
test was satisfied. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 997 (3d eir. 1988).
Additionally, neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested must require individ
ual member participation in the litigation. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. The court of appeals
determined that confiicts of interests precluded it from granting Polaroid third party stand
ing under this third factor of the Hunt test. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999-1000. For a
discussion of the confiicts of interests, see infra notes 325-68 and accompanying text.
324. Polaraid; 862 F.2d at 1001. In making this statement, the court of appeals
brushed off Polaroid's argument that granting Polaroid standing would promote securities
laws enforcement, which was in the public interest. See id. at 1000-01. The court, posing
several policy counterarguments, first stated that Polaroid's assertion failed to consider
whether granting a target company standing would result in an excessive level of enforce
ment, in terms of policy or congressional intent. [d. at 1000. Furthermore, Polaroid's
statement "fail[ed] to consider the impact of [granting a target corporation third party
standing] ... on any congressional decision to entrust regulatory decisions to ... [the
Securities and Exchange Commission] rather than private litigants and the courts." [d. at
1000-01. Finally, the court stated that Polaroid's argument failed to weigh the social costs
versus the benefits of a corporate takeover. [d. at 1001.
Unfortunately, the court did not address any of these issues. [d. at 998-1001. It
merely stated that "any attempt to rely upon one's own conception of what would consti
tute good tender offer policy, in addition to being inappropriate, is too latent with difficul
ties to yield a definitive answer." [d. at 1001. While this statement seems to indicate that it
would be easier or more appropriate to direct policy arguments about granting a target
corporation third party standing to Congress or the Securities and Exchange Commission,
discussion about the theoretica1limitations of judicial activism or of private policing of the
marketplace are beyond the scope of this article.
325. Hunt, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
326. [d. at 343; see supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
327. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999-1000; see supra notes 256-65 and accompanying text.
328. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1008 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (relating Judge Cowen's position).
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fact, courts have never granted an association standing where serious
conflicts of interest exist. 329 The takeover battle further illustrates
these conflicts. Here, potential conflicts exist not only between the
corporation and its shareholders, but also among the shareholder
groups themselves.
While courts have allowed associational standing even where con
flicting interests exist among association members and the associa
tion's courtroom success may harm the interests of some of them,330
Judge Cowen argued that a target corporation has standing to sue under the All-Holders
Rule. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1007-08. He noted that the Securities and Exchange Com
mission promulgated the All-Holders Rule to enforce and further the purposes of section
14(e), the anti-fraud provision of the Williams Act. Id. Judge Cowen found the majority's
holding that Polaroid had standing to assert a violation of section 14(e), but had no stand
ing to assert an All-Holders Rule violation, to be both inconsistent and a departure from
precedent. Id. at 1008. While this position may support an argument that Polaroid had a
private right of action under the All-Holders Rule (although the majority held otherwise),
it clearly contradicts existing requirements under which third party standing is granted.
See id. at 993-97 (regarding the majority's determination that Polaroid did not have stand
ing under a private right of action theory). A genuine obstacle must exist which prevents a
litigant from raising its own rights. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1976). Fur
thermore, the issue being litigated must materially impair the third party's ability to assert
its rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 196 (1976). No obstacle existed nor did the
issue being litigated prevent the ESOP trustee from raising an All-Holders Rule claim.
Thus, Polaroid would not meet the Supreme Court's prerequisites for third party standing.
See also supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
329. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999.
330. See. e.g., Humane Soc'y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Gillis v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 572-73 (6th
Cir. 1985); cj National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824
F.2d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (despite contrary interests of membership groups, unions would
have satisfied lISSOCiational standing requirements, but lacked standing because their mem
bers lacked standing individually); NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir.
1980) (where potential con1licts exist among association's members, the association does
not have standing if more members declare against its litigating position than in favor of it).
But see Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir.
1979) (diversity of members' interests and "actual and potential con1licts" among them
make association inadequate representative in litigation). See generally Note, Associational
Standing, supra note 179, at 180-81 & nn.37-40 (citing cases in which actual or potential
con1licts of interests among association members occurred).
The Hunt associational standing test implicitly supports the premise that con1licting
member interests do not preclude associational standing. See Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); National Maritime Union, 824 F.2d at
1232 n.7. The third factor of the test mandates that "neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt, 432
U.S. at 343; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (stating that associational
standing is valid "so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make
the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the
cause"); supra note 215 and accompanying text. Only when member interests become so
diverse that the claim asserted or the relief requested require individual participation would
associational standing fail. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1980) (association
conceded that membership held diverse abortion viewpoints; Supreme Court concluded
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these cases have involved only one potential conflict, that between dif
that a proper understanding and resolution of members' free exercise of religion claims
required their individual participation).
In National Maritime Union, the court stated that the defendants' contention that the
plaintiff associations lacked standing because their members had conflicting interests "may
be seen as an attempt to add a fourth factor to ... Hunt." 824 F.2d at 1231-32. The court
held that associational standing does not require that member interests be conjunctive. Id.
at 1232. In part, this is because harm to some members' interests is usually accepted as
part of the cost of obtaining associational benefits. Id. at 1233. Furthermore, "[m]embers,
as individuals or groups, if they had standing, could intervene to advance their interests in
the merits against the association's position." Id. at 1233-34. The court also maintained
that UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986), "arguably suggested that conflicting interests of
members did not preclude associational standing" because "associational standing was too
valuable to jettison." National Maritime Union, 824 F.2d at 1232-33.
Third party standing is allowed in other types of situations where conflicting interests
exist between a litigant and represented parties. In a class action, a representative party
sues or is sued on behalf of a common group, of which the representative must be a mem
ber. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) (discussing the real party in interest requirement); FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued ...."); F. JAMES & G.
HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.20 (1985). The representative has third party standing
on behalf of other class members. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9, at 627 (1984). Where inadequate representation or
representational conflicts exist, the litigation must be dismissed or the parties modified. See
FED. R. ClY. P. 23(a)(4) (The representative must "fairly and adequately protect the inter
ests of the class."); 7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1765, at 279-85 (1986). The conflicts between the representative and other
class members must go to the "heart of the controversy" before this occurs. See J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.2, at 731 (1985); see also
7A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra, § 1768, at 327 ("[O]nly a conflict that goes
to the very subject matter of the litigation will defeat a party's claim of representative
status."). However, standing analysis is distinct from adequacy of representation analysis.
E.g., Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); cf Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) ("That a suit may be a class action ... adds
nothing to the question of standing ...."). Review of standing is a threshold inquiry made
before that of representational adequacy. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 n.3
(1974); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 (1962); Hassine, 846 F.2d at 176 & n.3.
In a derivative action, the beneficiary of a fiduciary enforces a right of the fiduciary. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 154, § 73, at 487. For example, a trust beneficiary may sue on behalf
of a trust if a trustee refuses to do so or a shareholder may sue on behalf of a corporation if
those in control fail to enforce a right properly asserted by the corporation. Id. The benefi
ciary has third party standing on behalf of the fiduciary and other beneficiaries similarly
situated. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 298, §§ 358, 360, at 1038, 1045 (Re
garding shareholder derivative suits, "[i]n this sense, a derivative action is both a represen
tative action and a class action."); cf Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (stating
that the corporation is the real party in interest and the stockholder is "at best the nominal
plaintiff"). The beneficiary must fairly and adequately represent the interests of other ben
eficiaries similarly situated. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (regarding shareholder derivative
suits and actions by members of an unincorporated association); C. WRIGHT, supra note
154, § 73, at 487 (stating that the same general principles apply in trust beneficiaries' ac
tions as in shareholder derivative suits, except that federal rule 23.1 is not controlling). The
adequacy of representation standards, including those regarding conflicts of interest, are
analogous to those in class actions. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra,
§ 16.9, at 761 & n.25; see also 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAC
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ferent membership groups of the association.331 They did not involve
a battle for control of the association. 332 In the Polaroid takeover at
tempt, potential conflicts existed among Polaroid's shareholder groups
and between Polaroid's management and its shareholders. 333
1.

Shareholder Versus Shareholder

The first conflict of interest concerned those shareholders in favor
of a takeover and those opposed to it. Shareholder groups may have
incongruent views for a variety of reasons. 334 Some groups, such as
TIeE AND PROCEDURE § 1833, at 133-35 (1986) (noting that dismissal of a shareholder
derivative suit requires that serious conflict must exist between plaintiff and other share
holders and plaintiff must not be expected to act in their interests as it would be self
injurious). Similarly, standing analysis is distinct from the adequacy determination. See H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 298, § 361, at 1053 ("Before suing derivatively, the
.
shareholder must meet certain [standing] qualifications ....").
331. See, e.g., Humane Soc'y o/the United States, 840 F.2d at 59-60 & n.25 (some
members might not share goal being litigated); Gillis, 759 F.2d at 572 (theoretical conflict
between association members exists); National Maritime Union, 824 F.2d at 1232 (tempo
rary and permanent mariners, both represented by same associations, have contrary inter
ests); cf NCAA, 622 F.2d at 1391-92 (plaintiff and defendant associations include many of
the same members, whose interests would conflict depending on which side of the litigation
each supported).
A shareholder derivative suit "is almost invariably brought by minority stockholders
to challenge action that a majority of the stockholders approve." C. WRIGHT, supra note
154, § 72, at 475. However, the requirement exists that the representative plaintiff "fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders ... similarly situated." See FED.
R. CIV. P. 23.1; supra note 330. Majority stockholders are not comparable to a different
membership group in an association as they are not forced to join the minority shareholder
group's litigating position; the' plaintiff is not seeking to represent them. Cf 7C C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 330, § 1833, at 133. Thus, the majority and
minority shareholders are not "similarly situated." Id. at 138 & n.9. Furthermore, unlike
the Polaroid situation, the corporation itself, by definition, is not the force behind the ac
tion in a shareholder derivative suit, although the suit is technically brought by the corpo
ration. See Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1001 n.lO (3d Cir. 1988); Daily
Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 527-28, 535 n.ll (1984).
332. In cases where a battle for control of the entity occurred, the conflict between
different membership groups did not exist, and standing was allowed. See supra note 330
and accompanying text. For example, in Air Line Pilots Association v. UAL Corp., the court
held that the plaintiff, who was an employee, shareholder, union member and potential
acquiror of the corporation, was an adequate representative of all stockholders in the deriv
ative action because his economic interest and that of the stockholders were compatible.
717 F. Supp. 575, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1990). Thus, no
conflict existed between different shareholder groups. See supra note 330 and accompany
ing text. The court ruled that the plaintiff had standing to bring the derivative action. See
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 717 F. Supp. at 578-79 & n.6 (confusing the standing and adequacy of
representation determinations).
333. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999-1000.
334. The rational investor normally makes investment decisions by balancing risk
against reward. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COITLE, supra note 306, at 65 (discussing
"the spectrum of safety vs. opportunity"); P. MOORE, THE BUSINESS OF RISK 140 (1983).
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ESOPs, may have an interest in maintaining the status quo, and there
fore, oppose any takeover.33S Some investors may have a long-term
investment outlook, and may foresee greater returns on their invest
ment if the target corporation remains independent than if it is ac
quired. 336 Other stockholders, noting that the target corporation's
stock price has increased significantly because of the tender offer, may
see little upside potential remaining in their investment and feel that
Each rational investor makes an investment decision based on his or her risk averseness or
receptiveness. See B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. CoTnE, supra note 306, at 66 (stating that
security buyers are either defensive or aggressive, enterprising investors). However, other
personal considerations, such as tax implications, portfolio diversification strategies, or s0
cial or business philosophy, also color the decision to invest in or divest oneself of a particu
lar investment. See E. BRIGHAM & L. GAPENSKI, supra note 306, at 106 (regarding
portfolio diversification); B. GRAHAM, D. DoDD & S. CoTnE, supra note 306, at 68-70
(concerning tax considerations); P. MOORE, supra, at 116-29 (regarding portfolio diversifi
cation); Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis ofStock Mar
ket Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613, 670-71 (1988) (discussing
portfolio diversification); Siwolop, Ethical Investing?, FIN. WORLD, June 27, 1989, at 86
(noting various socially conscious investment agendas); see, e.g., A. DOMINI & P. KINDER,
ETHICAL INVESTING (1984) (regarding social policies); E. JUDD, INVESTING WITH A So-,
CIAL CONSCIENCE (1990). Group behavior may also be an influential factor in such deci
sions. See I. FIsHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 296-97 (1906); cf S.
FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGo, in XVIII THE CoM
PLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 117 (1955) (concerning "the herd
instinct" and human dependence on group reinforcement).
335. For reasons why employees may be unwilling to tender their stock to a tender
offeror, see supra note 29. Employees investing in an ESOP may have an acute interest in
avoiding a takeoyer since so much of their economic well-being is tied exclusively to the
firm for which they work. See P. MOORE, supra note 334, at 128 (stating that employee
interests may run counter to those of other shareholders because of employees' general
inability to diversify their risks); cf Doemberg & Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion,
23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103, 135-36 (1986) (arguing that employees should diversify their
investments and thus lower their overall portfolio risk, rather than invest in "the firm and
industry to which their human capital is tied."); White, As ESOPs Become Victims of '90s
Bankruptcies, Workers Are Watching Their Nest Eggs Vanish, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1991, at
Cl, col. 3 (quoting a pension consultant as stating that "ESOPs are the ultimate definition
of an undiversified investment."); Gottschalk, Too Much Loyalty May Have a High Price,
Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1990, at Cl, col. 3 (discussing the financial risks employees incur from
economic nondiversification - "being dependent on one company" for "income, insurance
and investments."). Because the portfolios of employees investing in an ESOP may be less
diversified than those of employees who do not invest in their own companies, the risk that
"unforeseen developments" will threaten their firm's viability is particularly significant.
Doemberg & Macey, supra.
336. See Robinson, Developing and Analyzing a Corporation Shareowner Profile, in
SHAREOWNER ACTIVISM: THE EMERGING ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 89, 140
(practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 575,
1987) (stating that individual holders of record tend to be long-term investors and "repre
sent the most assured source of management support"); cf McCarthy, Coke Stake of6.3%,
2nd Biggest Held in Soft-Drink Giant, Bought by Buffett, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1989, at A4.
col. 2 (quoting investor Warren Buffett as stating that his "favorite holding period is
forever").
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better investment opportunities exist elsewhere. 337 This last share
holder group would react favorably to a takeover.
Another conflict between shareholder groups would occur if some
stockholders were excluded from a tender offer. The court of appeals
stated:
Even shareholders injured by their exclusion from a tender offer
may sometimes profit handsomely . . . . The market price of the
stock of a corporation jumps skyward within minutes after a credi
ble tender offer is made. Excluded holders of the security can thus
profit . . . by selling their shares at the market price to third
parties. 338

While this is true, it ignores the fact that the excluded stockhold
ers do not have the potential to sell their securities at the tender offer
price. The financial markets often discount a tender offer price by two
variables: 339 risk 340 and the time value of money.341 Both excluded
and nonexcluded stockholders can eliminate the risk that a tender of
fer will be unsuccessful by selling their stock. 342 However, regarding
the time value of money, only the excluded stockholders are denied
the opportunity to realize the full tender offer price. They can only
receive the value of the tender offer discounted by an interest rate re
337. See. e.g., B. GRAHAM, D. DoDD & S. CoTrLE, supra note 306, at 27 (discussing
a valuation approach concerned with relative rather than intrinsic values of individual
investments).
338. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 999 (3d Cir. 1988).
339. Cf I. FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST As DETERMINED BY IMPATIENCE
TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INvEST IT 223-24 (1930) (discussing risk and
time value as factors influencing investment opportunity).
340. See Ryngaert, Netter & Malmquist, Shareholder Welfare and Substantial Share
Acquisitions Outside o/the Williams Act, 1988 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 505, 509.
341. See. e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 271
(2d Cir. 1986) (noting testimony about how the time value of money would affect the rela
tive values of two competing offers); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., 564 A.2d
342, 351 (Del. Ch. 1989) (restating an assertion that "the time value of money alone
reduces the value of both [tender] offers by approximately $1 per share for each month's
delay in closing of the offer. ").
Assuming all other elements are equal, the financial markets will discount a tender
offer only if the tender offer price is viewed as fair or likely to succeed. If the markets view
the offer price as too low, the stock will trade at a premium to it. See Bebchuk, Toward
Undistoned Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 MARv. L. REv. 1693,
1728 (1985). The premium will reflect the markets' view of a reasonable or likely takeover
price discounted by a time value factor. See Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 271; In re
Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 351.
342. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 315, at 267. By selling their stock, stockholders lock
in their returns on their investments. See id. No more risk exists because the stockholder
no longer owns the asset. See id.
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fleeting the value of money invested until the offer is executed. 343 As
suming everything else is equal, after a successful tender offer, the
remaining outstanding shares (those of excluded stockholders) will
trade at a lower price, reflecting their percentage of ownership in the
corporation at that time. 344 The conflict, then, is between stockhold
ers allowed to participate in the tender offer and receive the full value
offered for their shares and excluded stockholders who can never re
ceive that amount. 345 Unless they are willing to sell their shares on the
market for less than the tender offer price or hold onto their shares,
excluded stockholders may well be opposed to a takeover in which
they are treated unfairly. 346
343. The highest price an excluded shareholder may receive, assuming that the
tender offer's success is certain and the financial and economic markets are stable between
the tender offer announcement and its execution, is the stock price on the last day prior to
the tender offer execution date. See In re Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 351 (discussing the time
value of money).
344. See Ryngaert, Netter & Malmquist, supra note 340, at 512. This argument as
sumes that all other influences are nonexistent. However, in reality, other factors may
affect stock price. For example, the post-tender offer price of the outstanding shares may
trade at a discount to their actual value, reflecting their lack of control of the firm (because
of their minority position) or a loss of liquidity (because a ready market for the shares no
longer exists). See Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy,
in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER, supra
note 2, at 371, 373-75, 377-78, reprinted in 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 911, at 917-20, 925-27
(1987); Bebchuk, supra note 341, at 1696, 1708-13; cf E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G.
BERLSTEIN, supra note 318, at 268 (discussing the thin market existing after a corpora
tion's self-tender offer). Other important factors are general financial and economic condi
tions, and conditions within the industry in which the corporation exists. See B. GRAHAM,
D. DODD & S. COTILE, supra note 306, at 3-4, 88; see also T. HOPKINS, MERGERS, ACQUI
smONS, AND DIVESTITURES: A GUIDE TO THEIR IMPACT FOR INVESTORS AND DIREC
TORS 10 (1983) (company, industry, and stock market on which it is traded influence
market price of a particular issue).
345. See Bebchuk, supra note 341, at 1696, 1730, 1733 ("[T]endering shareholders
can generally expect to receive in the event of a takeover more than their pro rata share of
the acquisition price" while "non-tendering shareholders ... receive significantly less than
their pro rata share. ").
346. Several other reasons may support excluded stockholders' opposition to a
tender offer. The Polaroid court stated that "[i]f the excluded holders fail to sell to third
parties, they still have the shares they started out with when the tender offer closes; in this
sense they are no worse off than if there had been no tender offer." Polaroid Corp. v.
Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 999 (3d Cir. 1988). This statement fails to account for the opportu
nity cost excluded stockholders incur by being unable to cash out of an investment which
has increased greatly because of a tender offer (and thus, may offer little future appreciation
potential) and reinvest the proceeds in another investment vehicle with greater possibilities.
See W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, EcONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 36 (4th ed. 1988)
(defining opportunity cost); 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS 718
21 (1987) (discussing the concept of opportunity cost). It also fails to consider that ex
cluded stockholders' shares may ultimately be worth less, given the risk, if the successful
acquiror increases corporate debt to finance the acquisition. See Kahn v. United States
Sugar Corp., No. 7313, at 7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985) (WESTLAW, DE-CS directory). The
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In the situation where excluded and nonexcluded stockholders

have opposing viewpoints regarding a takeover, as in those instances
where shareholder groups have different investment expectations or
have vested interests, the target corporation, no matter what side it
chooses, will be in a position antithetical to a shareholder group. 347
Yet, the All-Holders Rule does not consider the target corporation's
relationships with its shareholder factions. The Rule precludes dis
crimination among shareholder groups by requiring potential ac
quirors to open the tender offer to all security holders of that class of
securities subject to the offer. 348 It addresses potential conflicts among
security holders - the owners of the corporation - not a conflict
between the target corporation and its shareholders. 349 Under the All
Holders Rule, only the security holders are able to show an actual or
threatened injury3S0 and only they have a personal stake in the out
come of the controversy.3S1 The All-Holders Rule litigation and the
Polaroid Corporation should have been mutually exclusive: the litiga
tion had nothing to do with exclusion of corporate shares from the
tender offer, because the corporation had none at stake. Rather, Po
laroid's only interest was that the outcome of the All-Holders Rule
controversy might indirectly affect whether the takeover attempt suc
ceeded. Thus, the court properly denied Polaroid third party standing
court's statement that excluded shareholders may be better off for having been excluded
because they can sue the tender offeror for damages is unrealistic. See Polaroid, 862 F.2d at
999. Rational investors normally will not buy into a risky lawsuit if they have the opportu
nity to realize substantial gains on their investments and reinvest the proceeds elsewhere.
Cf H. KluPKE, supra note 315, at 267 (A person offered cash for his stock is mainly con
cerned with how much money he can get, the procedures he must follow, and when he can
get it.).
Each of the above examples of the effects of discriminatory treatment of excluded
stockholders provides that group with additional reasons to oppose a takeover favored by
other shareholder groups. See also Sesit, Many Suchard Minority Holders Steamed Over
Philip Morris Offer, Wall St. J., July 16, 1990, at Cl, col. 5, C19, col. 1 (discussing how the
lack of an All-Holders Rule in Switzerland left minority stockholders in one takeover "with
the option of being an oppressed minority or a disadvantaged seller").
347. For a discussion of the management-shareholder conflict, see infro notes 352-68
and accompanying text.
348. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14d-10(a)(l) (1990); Amendments to Rules, supra note 65,
at 88,188-91.
349. See Amendments to Rules, supra note 65, at 88,188. The Securities and Ex
change Commission did not discuss the target corporation at all, only its stockholders. See
id. It focused on eliminating discriminatory treatment among target corporation security
holders, stating that the All-Holders Rule "further[ed] the purposes ofthe Williams Act by
assuring fair and equal treatment of all holders of the class of securities that is the subject of
a tender offer." See id.
350. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
351. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 999 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra note 194.
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on behalf of its ESOP because the Rule was designed to address con
flicts of interests among shareholders only.
2.

Management Versus Shareholders

The second conflict of interest was between Polaroid's manage
ment and its shareholders. The court of appeals stated that "[e]ven
though some shareholders are disadvantaged by their exclusion from
the tender offer, a great majority of shareholders will often benefit
from [it]" and thus, the corporation "may have an eye to protecting
the interests of the majority" at the expense of the minority sharehold
ers. 3S2 While this is theoretically true,3S3 in practical terms, corporate
management is more inclined to resist a takeover as it may result in a
loss of management earnings, employment, and perquisites. 3s4 Proxy
fights3SS are difficult and expensive for even large shareholders to
mount.3S6 In the modem corporate context, shareholder voting rights
352. Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 999. A variety of shareholder groups with their own agen
das may complicate a takeover situation even more than a simple majority-minority split
will. See Law, Corporate Takeovers, in Letters to the Editor, HARV. Bus. REv. Jan.-Feb.
1985, at 172, 173-74. Professor Law wonders whose wealth among them should be maxi
mized. Id. at 174. In this regard, some corporate managers feel that short-term investors
should be ignored. Fogg, Takeovers: Last Chance For Self-Restraint, HARV. Bus. REv.,
Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 30, 32.
353. See Fogg, supra note 352, at 31-32.
354. Bamonte, The Dynamics of State Protectionism: A Short Critique of the crs
Decision, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 259, 261 n.l0 (1988); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role ofa Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161,
1175 (1981); Jensen, supra note 302, at 116; Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98
YALE L.J. 127, 141 (1988); Rosenzweig, Target Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 110, 120
(1986); Note, Toward Standards for Managers Subject to Hostile Bids: The Tri-Level
Model, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 269, 277-79 (1988); cf. DeMott, Introduction-The Biggest
Deal Ever, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1, 15 (discussing incumbent management perquisites of the
RJR Nabisco Corp.).
355. In a "proxy contest," management and dissident stockholders fight for control
of the corporation. 3C H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 3, § 13.10. Each side solicits other
stockholders' votes, generally for the election of a new slate of directors. Jensen, supra note
302, at 112. For a short history of pre-Williams Act proxy contests, see Hablutzel & Sel
mer, Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and Overview, 8 N. ILL. u.L. REv. 203, 203-05
(1988).
356. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control,
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1,6-7 (1978); see also Johnson
& Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1862, 1876 n.67 (1989) (noting
that the tender offer has been a popular method to gain control of a corporation because of
the difficulties that one incurs when challenging management in a proxy contest). One
reason proxy contests are difficult is because "management controls the proxy machinery."
Johnson & Millon, supra. Management is likely to have a decisive impact on shareholder
voting and the results of that vote. Id.; e.g., Hylton, Advisers in Forefront of New Proxy
Wars, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1990, at 01, col. 4, 04, col. 4 (Lockheed Corp.'s management
moved up the company's annual meeting by six weeks, thus reducing the time Harold
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are a fiction; in most instances, management runs the corporation as
it sees fit without regard to shareholder interests. 3S7 Thus, whether
some shareholders, such as Polaroid's ESOP which held a 14% mi
nority stake in the company,3S8 are disadvantaged by the ten
der offer, or others see it as advantageous good fortune,3S9 is irrelSimmons had to convince shareholders to vote his position. "[T]he longer the period of
time the dissident has to wage the proxy fight, the better chance he has to succeed."); see
also Hylton, supra, at Dl, col. 4, 04, col. 4 (noting that the cost of Harold Simmons' quest
to seek control of the Lockheed Corp. via a proxy contest will be about $6 million);
Wartzman & Blumenthal, Lockheed Wins Proxy Battle With Simmons, Wall St. J., Apr. 11,
1990, at A3, col. 1 (Simmons "spent considerably more than $6 million.'.').
357. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 354, at 1170-71. Easterbrook and Fis
chel have stated:
Each shareholder will recognize that his votes will not affect the outcome of any
dispute unless he has a large bloc of shares.... If each shareholder reasons in the
same way, as he should, the managers of the firm will prevail in any contest about
their operation of the company. And that is the pattern in the market. Share
holders routinely vote for managers or pay no attention to elections. Successful
campaigns against managers are rare, and they seldom succeed even if one dissi
dent shareholder holds a large bloc of stock that he can vote in his own favor.
Id. at 1171. However, the authors state that the threat of a takeover is a mechanism for
monitoring and replacing poor managers. Id. at 1173-74. Professor Fischel reemphasized
this point:
In any agency relationship-such as the relationship between shareholders and
managers-the interests of the agent will diverge from those of the principal. The
agent will have incentives to consume excess leisure or otherwise act in ways
inconsistent with maximizing the wealth of the principal. . . .
... [However], the market for corporate control, particularly the merger and
the tender offer, provide a mechanism for displacing inefficient managers .... The
existence of this mechanism provides managers with ... [an] incentive to mini
mize agency costs to avoid being the target of a takeover bid.
Fischel, supra note 298, at 918-19 (footnote omitted); see also Baysinger & Butler, Antitake
over Amendments. Managerial Entrenchment. and the Contractual Theory of the Corpora
tion, 71 VA. L. REv. 1257, 1302 (1985) (stating that "the threat of hostile takeovers
provides an incentive for incumbent management to act in the best interest of stockholders,
and thus to maximize the market price of the company's stock"); Jensen & Ruback, supra
note 307, at 29-30 (Takeovers partially deter "major managerial departures from max
imization of stockholder wealth."); Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36
STAN. L. REv. 923, 958-59 & nn.98-101 (1984) (noting an argument which theorizes that
managers do not act adversely to shareholder interests because stock values would decline,
and the threat of employment loss via a takeover acts as a deterrent). See generally
Geneen, Why Directors Con't Protect the Shareholders, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 28, 28
29 (in which former ITT Chairman Harold S. Geneen states that corporate boards of direc
tors "follow meekly where the chief executive leads" and that "there are few if any genuine
checks or balances on the power of the chief executive in large public corporations").
358. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 698 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (D. Del.), aff'd in port and
vacated in port, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,
559 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. Ch. 1989); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d
257, 272 (Del. Ch. 1989).
359. See H. KRIPKE, supra note 315, at 267.
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evant. 360 The key determinative is the position that management per
ceives to be in its best interests. 361 In this case, Polaroid's manage
ment saw that by setting up an ESOP and by suing Shamrock, it was
360. In Polaroid's case, Delaware's business combination statute further allowed
management to take into account considerations in addition to shareholders' interests. See
generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1990). Business combination statutes are a
type of state anti takeover law which prevents corporate raiders from completing certain
business combinations, such as mergers, consolidations, substantial asset sales, or liquida
tions, for 3-5 years after a successful tender offer. Johnson & Millon, supra note 356, at
1874. "The key feature of these statutes is that they expressly inject target company man
agement into the decisionmaking process, giving it an effective veto power over hostile bids
to be followed· by 'business combinations' - a veto that the bidder and target company
shareholders are virtually powerless to override." Id. at 1875; see id. at 1876 n.68 ("One
should not be misled by efforts to package these antitakeover laws in proshareholder
terms."). Delaware's business combination statute provides that a raider who acquires
85% or more of a corporation's stock is excepted from the statute's provisions. See DEL.
CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1990). Professors Johnson and Millon cite the Dela
ware statute as a reason Shamrock's efforts to acquire Polaroid were unsuccessful:
In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., [559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch.
1989)], the Delaware Chancery Court upheld Polaroid's action of issuing approxi
mately 14% of its outstanding stock to a newly established Employee Stock Own
ership Plan. When coupled with Polaroid's share repurchase plan and placement
of preferred stock into friendly hands, the ESOP measure made it virtually impos
sible for Shamrock to acquire 85% of Polaroid's stock as needed to escape opera
tion of Delaware's anti takeover statute. As a result, Shamrock dropped its bid.
Johnson & Millon, supra note 356, at 1875.76 n.66 (citation omitted); see Note, The Dela
ware Takeover Statute: Constitutionally Infirm Even Under the Market Participant Excep
tion, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 203, 209-10 & n.41 (1988). Management's control over the
course of events rendered shareholder sentiment immaterial. See Johnson & Millon, supra
note 356, at 1875-76.
361. See generally Rosenzweig, supra note 354. The Polaroid court stated:
As Polaroid's home state of Delaware has recognized, measures adopted to ward
off a takeover raise "the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily
in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders
"
While those who manage the corporation have a fiduciary duty to respond to
takeovers in the best interests of the corporation's shareholders, this legal duty
may only limit the extent to which the disparate interests of management and
shareholders affect managerial behavior.
Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1000 & n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985». Where antitakeover devices are
substantial, "[t]he incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management
to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced." See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 643 (1982); see also Dann & DeAngelo, Corporate Financial Policy and Corporate
Control: A Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset and Ownership Structure, 20 J. FIN.
EcON. 87, 96-99 (1988) (Decreased shareholder wealth results when management defen
sively responds to attempted hostile takeovers.); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 354, at
1175 (arguing that management defensive tactics decrease shareholder welfare); cf Jarrell,
Brickley & Netter, The Marketfor Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980,
J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49, 66 ("[D]efensive measures that require shareholder
voting approval are less likely to be harmful to shareholder wealth than are defensive meas
ures not subject to shareholder approval.").
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bettering its own position. 362 However, management's interests con
flicted with those of any shareholders who wished to tender their
shares. 363 Thus, its position was incongruent with this shareholder
group.364 To allow management third party standing to assert an AlI
Holders Rule violation on behalf of another shareholder group, its
ESOP, would "undermine[ ] the basis for jus tertii standing-that the
jus tertii advocate will vigorously assert the interests of the right
holder."36S The shareholders in favor of the offer would effectively be
362. By setting up an ESOP, Polaroid's management improved its position in three
ways. First, it increased the cost required to effectuate a takeover. See Shamrock Hold
ings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 274 (Del. Ch. 1989) (discussing the dilutive
effect of issuing the ESOP shares); supra note 46. Second, Polaroid's management arguably
gained the support of a constituency who might vote against a takeover because of job
security concerns and the fear of a new employment environment. See Shamrock Hold
ings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. Ch. 1989); supra note 29. Third, the
ESOP gave employees an incentive to improve production and increase efficiency, since as
owners, the results would directly accrue to them in the form of higher stock prices and
dividend payments; this would result in increased longterm management benefits. Cf
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 272 (Del. Ch. 1989) (noting that
ESOPs are effective employee motivators). Thus, an ESOP "can effectively eliminate a
hostile offer and maintain operation ofthe corporation by the current management." Note,
Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 29, at 606.
A "variety of tactical considerations" can lead target corporations to sue potential
acquirors. Rosenzweig, supra note 354, at 120. Target managers' self-interest plays a large
part in these lawsuits. Id. at 126. Polaroid used many of the tactics discussed by Professor
Rosenzweig. See id. at 120-26. For example, Polaroid's tactics included seeking a prelimi
nary injunction enjoining Shamrock's tender offer. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987,
989 (3d Cir. 1988). Polaroid also asserted that Shamrock violated disclosure requirements
regarding margin regulations. Id. at 1003. Delay allowed Polaroid time to find a white
knight. See supra notes 21 & 46. It also increased the risk and expense of the tender offer,
which Shamrock ultimately abandoned. See supra note 46; see also Comment, An Implied
Private Right, supra note 48, at 318 (stating that target counsel often sue potential ac
quirors, alleging Williams Act violations and asking to enjoin the tender offer, as the delay
creates a litigation overhead cost). Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the crea
tion of the ESOP "had to have been motivated, at least in part, by a desire to add one more
obstacle to Shamrock's potential acquisition bid." Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid
Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 276 (Del. Ch. 1989). In short, Polaroid's clear goal in its litigation
was to avoid a takeover and to allow management to retain control. See Rosenzweig, supra
note 354, at 133.
Judge Richard Posner has summed up target corporation antitakeover attempts by
stating, "the arguments for defensive measures ... giv[e] too little weight to the effect of
'defensive' measures in rendering shareholders defenseless against their own manage
ments." Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
363. See Jarrell, supra note 307, at 152, 174 (1985) ("[I]t is hard to find any case
where remaining independent was beneficial to target shareholders, as measured by stock
returns.").
364. See Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 29, at 606 ("Frequently,
incumbent management will respond to a hostile tender offer with tactics harmful to cur
rent owners. An ESOP is such a tactic.").
365. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987,999 (3d Cir. 1988). One commentator
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represented only by an outside party, the potential acquiror, instead of
the corporation of which they were owners. Therefore, the litigation .
required individual member participation366 because shareholder
. groups' interests were so diverse 367 and the corporation was unable "to
vindicate the interests of all."368
Thus, the potential conflicts of interest in litigation under the All
Holders Rule strongly discourage' granting a corporation third party
standing on behalf of its shareholders.

c.

The Existence of a Better Associational Representative:
The ESOP

To assert an All-Holders Rule violation during a takeover, a tar
get corporation's shareholders - not the corporation itself - must
bring their own lawsuit. 369 In Polaroid Corp. v. Disney,370 because the
ESOP trustee had standing to sue,371 and thus, had the ability to assert
the ESOP's rights,372 a prerequisite to a grant of third party standing
has noted that "target management is an inappropriate party to charge with initiating en
forcement [of the Williams Act)." Comment, An Implied Private Right, supra note 48, at
317 (discussing target management's self-interest in maintaining control of the target
corporation).
366. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977); supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
367. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1980); supra note 330. The poten
tial diversity of viewpoints among shareholder groups rendered Polaroid an ineffective rep
resentative of all those positions. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
368. See UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refu
gee Comrn. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring»; supra notes
224-27 and accompanying text.
369. The Polaroid court stated that "the All Holders Rule creates a private right of
action enabling injured shareholders to sue a tender offeror whose offer violates the Rule."
Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 1001-02.
370. 862 F.2d 987.
371. See id. at 1002; supra note 369.
372. Under one commentator's view, whether Polaroid or the ESOP trustee litigated
the claim was irrelevant because they maintained a cooperative relationship. See Note,
Does a Target Corporation Have Standing to Sue Under the All Holders Rule? The Third
Circuit Says No in Polaroid Corp. v. Shamrock, 862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988),58 U. CIN. L.
REV. 717, 744-45 (1989) (stating that the Polaroid ESOP trustee was a mere puppet of
management and arguing that ESOP standing should thus be determined on a fact-specific
basis). Nonetheless, "[a]n ESOP trustee is required to act for the exclusive benefit of the
participants and beneficiaries and to act in a reasonably prudent manner." Ershick v. Greb
X-Ray Co., 705 F. Supp. 1482, 1486 n.l (D. Kan. 1989) (citing Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d
453, 459 (10th Cir. 1978». As the Ershick court stated:
. 29 U.S.C. § II000a)(I) imposes upon an ESOP trustee certain fiduciary duties.
The trustee must act prudently in the discharge of its duties. It must act "solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries" of the ESOP, and it must act
"with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then pre
vailing" that a reasonable person would exercise.
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- that the third party must be genuinely unable to raise its own rights
- would not have been satisfied. 373 Therefore, in addition to the in
trinsic conflicts of interests, Polaroid was an inappropriate litigant in
this context. 374
Associational standing doctrine would not have stood in the way
of the ESOP trustee litigating an All-Holders Rule claim. Polaroid
had no "pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital" unavailable to
its ESOP; it merely hired a large New York law firm to represent its
position. 37s The ESOP trustee, representing a large block of stock and
a significant Polaroid constituency, its employees, could have done the
same. 376 If the ESOP trustee's concern about being excluded from the
tender offer had risen to the point where it decided to file suit, argua
bly this would promote superior litigation and judicial decision-mak
ing because the right-holders themselves would be before the court. 377
Only if the ESOP had brought its own lawsuit would the Williams
Act's objective of investor protection378 - in this case, protection of
shareholders in favor of the tender offer - be promoted.
CONCLUSION

Max Holland spoke of "[h]uge pools of concentrated capital" and
"swollen and unfocused corporations" as fueling the rise of corporate
raiders during the 19808. 379 As a former target company employee
stated, "[It] can [all] be summarized in one word: greed."380 The war
between the Polaroid Corporation, that is, Polaroid's management,
and Roy Disney for control of the company's resources exemplifies the
contests that have occurred between raiders and undervalued corpora
tions in the past decade. At its heart, the issue of whether a target
Id. at 1486 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § II000a)(I) (1988»; see also Ingrassia, Polaroid ESOP Has
Independent Role in Shamrock Bid. Labor Agency Advises, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at
A4, col. 2.
.
373. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (discussing the legal inability of
a third party to assert its rights).
375. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text; see also Polaroid Corp. v. Dis
ney, 862 F.2d 987, 989 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Cravath, Swain & Moore as Polaroid's
counsel).
376. The ESOP, which could afford to purchase 9.7 million Polaroid shares (about
14 percent of Polaroid's outstanding stock) for $300 million, would not "find the cost of the
litigation beyond ... [its] means." Polaroid, 862 F.2d at 998; see Shamrock Holdings, Inc.
v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 271-72 (Del. Ch. 1989).
377. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 103-08.
379. M. HOLLAND, WHEN THE MACHINE STOPPED 255 (1989).
380. Helyar, supra note 302.
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company should have third party standing on behalf of a shareholder
group provides an insight into the conflicts that can occur during a
hostile takeover and demonstrates how shareholders may end up mere
pawns, their interests of secondary importance in the battle between
target and potential acquiror.
In Polaroid Corp. v. Disney,381 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
confronted the question of whether a target corporation should have
third party standing to assert a violation of the All-Holders Rule by a
potential acquiror. While the court held that the Rule does not permit
a target corporation to have standing in an associational context, a
determination of the relative congruency of protecting shareholders
and organizational purpose may well satisfy'the requirements of the
second factor of the Hunt 382 test. A key variable is the weight given to
the promotion of long-term business prospects.
The court's concern about the potentially serious conflicting in
terests that exist in a takeover situation augmented its decision to deny
Polaroid third party standing. Different shareholder groups may have
conflicts depending on their perspectives as to the benefits or detri
ments of a takeover. Additionally, the inability of excluded stockhold
ers to receive the same value for their shares as nonexcluded
stockholders may result in conflicts. As the All-Holders Rule ad
dresses relationships among security holders, the target corporation is
an inappropriate party to address these conflicts. Under the court's
reasoning, the target would be unable to vigorously assert the rights of
all stockholders.
A second conflict potentially exists between target corporation
management and its shareholders. Management's hostile reaction to a
tender offer may not only make it an inappropriate advocate of share
holder interests favoring a takeover, but presents a genuine conflict of
interest which weighs against it representing any shareholder in take
over litigation.
A basic tenet of third party standing doctrine is that the third
party must be genuinely unable to raise its own rights. Since share
holders have standing under the All-Holders Rule, an ESOP trustee
may represent the employee shareholders of the target corporation.
Granting a target corporation third party standing would be improper
because shareholders themselves are able to raise their own rights.
The ESOP is a better associational representative than the target
corporation.
381.
382.

862 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1988).
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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Diverse shareholder interests, combined with management's self
interest and the existence of a litigant which may represent itself in
court, make the target corporation an unsuitable representative under
the All-Holders Rule. Allowing corporate management to have third
party standing on behalf of a shareholder group would give it too
much added advantage in the tug of war between target and acquiror.
Neither of the Williams Act's purposes of disclosure and investor pro
tection would be served by allowing a target corporation to litigate an
All-Holders Rule claim. Rather, stockholders might well receive une
qual treatment depending on the viewpoint they favored or the share
holder group to which they belonged.
Thomas D'Urfey once wrote that "[a]ll shoes fit not all feet."383
Recognizing this truth, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit appropriately turned down Polaroid's attempt to stand
in the shoes of its ESOP, and in doing so, added one more dimension
to the takeover wars that dominated the corporate world during the
19808.
Joseph Kershenbaum

383.

T.

D'URFEY, QUIXOTE,

Act V, sc. 2.

